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JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND LITIGATION
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
Edward L. Rubin* & Malcolm M. Feeley*
In a book published several years ago, Judicial Policy Making and the
Modern State,' we argued that policy making is a standard and legiti-
mate function of modern courts, as standard and well-accepted as
fact-finding or the interpretation of authoritative texts. The case
study we provided in support of this argument involved the prison re-
form cases decided between 1965 and 1990, which we uncontrover-
sially described as the high-water mark of judicial policy making in
American history.! We did not, however, advance any claim about
whether judicial policy making, either in the prison reform cases or
in general, is actually effective. All we claimed is that it is a standard
and legitimate function of the courts.'
This, of course, leaves an important question open. Judicial policy
making may be standard and legitimate, but is it a good idea? This
question is a crucial one in assessing the value of litigation against the
government. Modem litigants very often go to court because they
want to obtain a decision that declares new public policy, and they
sometimes obtain such a decision whether they wanted it or not. It is
simply not conceivable that courts could be prohibited from making
public policy to some extent.4 No modern nation has a judicial sys-
tem subject to this prohibition, not even those that claim they do, like
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4 This is a proposition that is commonplace in all standard histories of the common law.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACr LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE
STUDY (1965) (stating law is a reflection of social interests); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW (Howe ed. 1963) (1881) (asserting the life of the law is, in part, intuitions of pub-
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indeed celebrated as its genius-by historians of the common law remains highly problematic
for students of modern administrative and constitutional law. One consequence is a dearth of
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France. As virtually every political scientist who has studied the mat-
ter has asserted, and as even most legal scholars are willing to con-
cede, policy making inheres in the basic structure of a modern judi-
ciary.6  For the foreseeable future, therefore, any discussion of
litigation against the government must incorporate the fact that such
litigation will regularly induce the judiciary to make public policy.
Perhaps the strongest defense of this position is Owen Fiss' claim
that as "coordinate branches" of government the federal courts have
not only a right, but an obligation to make policy.7 He argues that
the Constitution "creates the agencies of government, describes their
functions, and determines their relationships," but that in addition it
"also identifies the values that will inform and limit this governmental
structure."" "Adjudication," he maintains, "is the social process by
which judges give meaning to our public values."' There is, he be-
lieves, a need for courts "to give [these values] specific meaning, to
give them operational content, and, where there is a conflict, to set
priorities.""' Although he believes that this has always been the func-
tion of constitutional adjudication, he acknowledges that in the mod-
ern administrative state, this task has become more important and
has led to a new form of constitutional adjudication, whose task is the
structural reform of large-scale organizations and particularly gov-
ernment bureaucracies.' Indeed for him, the special task of con-
temporary constitutional adjudication is to protect against the threats
to our constitutional values that are posed by the operations of large-
scale organizations, and to develop new types of remedies that are
expansive enough to restructure and transform organizations that
threaten basic constitutional values.'2  "Structural reform litigation"
represents an important advance in adjudication. It acknowledges
the bureaucratic character of the modern state and the important
public dimension that judicial power can play in controlling it.
5 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITIcAL ANALYSIS (1981) (asserting
that courts everywhere make policies that reflect regime interests).
, See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, lAW AND THE MODERN MINI) (1932) (asserting that judges base
decisions on submerged psychological factors); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADIUDICATION (1997) (stating judges' decisions reflect class biases); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE
JUDICIAL MIND (1965) (stating that judicial decision making reflectsjudges' ideologies);JEFFREV
A. SEGAL & HAROLDJ. SPAITI, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE A'I-ITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (stat-
ing that judicial decision making reflectsjudges' attitudes); SIIAPIRO, supra note 5 (stating that
courts are the agents of the dominant regime).
7 Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forns offJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
8 Id. at 1.
S Id. at 2.
10 N. at 1.
11 ht. at 44.
12 Id. at 44-46.
1. Id. at 2.
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For Fiss, there is no dilemma as to whether individuals should
have the power to sue government. He has an expansive normative
position that provides a vigorous defense of structural reform adjudi-
cation, one that empowers individuals to sue government. 4 However
in his robust defense of the new "form" of adjudication, Fiss fails to
identify the "limits" that would bound this activity.
I. THE PROMISE AND PROBLEM OF NEW LEGAL PROCESS
A. The Origin of New Legal Process
In assessing the desirability of judicial policy making, it must be
assumed that policy making per se is desirable. Policy making is de-
fined by Ronald Dworkin as the effort by government actors to pro-
duce socially desirable results.'" More specifically, it is a conscious ef-
fort by government actors to intervene in the social and economic
spheres to improve the citizenry's quality of life.'" Such efforts are the
defining feature of the administrative state, and constitute the ration-
ale for the structure of modern government. Political and legal theo-
fists may disagree about their content and extent, but only Robert
Nozick argues that the government should not make policy at all.'
7
The question, then, is not whether government should make pub-
lic policy, but how it should do so. In the context of litigation against
government, the question is whether public policy should be made by
courts. For any legal scholar, this issue, namely the issue of whether a
particular task should be performed by the courts, will bring to mind
the mode of analysis known as legal process. Legal process was the
academy's response to legal realism, which was itself a response to
formalism. Formalism argued that common law, or legal doctrine,
embodies general, logically coherent legal principles that transcend
politics, and can thus be asserted against political decision makers."
14 Id. at 17, 18-24.
15 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1067-73 (1975) (defining and com-
menting on policy making).
16 Id. Public policy can thus be distinguished from foreign policy, which governments have
always done, and is essentially uncontroversial; that is, no one, not even Nozick, argues that
government should not engage in conscious efforts to manage its relationship with foreign gov-
ernments. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (defending the
ultraminimal state, but granting the state a role in foreign policy).
17 See generally NOZICK, supra note 16 (asserting state action inevitably violates individual
rights). Friedrich A. Hayek condemns economic planning, but he acknowledges, however
grudgingly, the desirability of policy making in other areas. See FRIEDRICi A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 87 (1960).
18 See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdells Orthodoxy, 45 U. PFrT. L. REV. 1 (1983) (discussing
the impact of Langdell's creed "law is a science"); Dennis Patterson, Langdel's Legacy, 90 Nw. U.
L. REx'. 196 (1995) (comparing Langdell's approach with modern interdisciplinary legal analy-
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The realists responded that such principles do not exist; law is always
the creation of a specific governmental agent, and is thus subordinate
to politics. In addition, they asserted, doctrine is generally incoher-
ent, and cannot prevail over established political authority."" This re-
sponse comported with the views of social scientists, and possessed
the political virtue of discouraging the sort of counterproductive ju-
dicial imperialism that the courts of the period frequently indulged
in, but it had a corrosive effect on the possibilities of legal scholar-
ship. It threatened to subsume the field into social science, thereby
requiring legal scholars to become social scientists of law, a task for
which they were eminently unqualified."'
Legal process, which flourished in the decades following World
War II, enabled legal scholars to rehabilitate doctrinal scholarship.'
In essence, they conceded that law is subordinate to politics, but then
argued, in a crucial move, that there exists a purely procedural prin-
ciple that transcends politics, namely, that particular governmental
institutions have distinctive areas of competence. The legislature and
the executive are properly assigned the task of making public policy,
both because they reflect the popular will and because they can call
upon trained specialists. But once policy is stated in terms of rules,
the courts are properly assigned the task of determining whether par-
ticular persons have obeyed or violated those rules, because such de-
terminations depend on reasoned arguments and must be made by
following formal procedures. Polycentric issues, such as resource
allocation decisions that involve trade-offs between many different
programs, are best left to the policy making branches, but contests
sis); John Henry Schlegel, Langdells Legacy, Or, the Case of the lEmpty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1517 (1984) (reviewing two torts' relation to formalism).
19 See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND TIE MODERN MIND (1930); Felix Cohen, Trarucenden-
tal Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) (dismissing the basis of
law as a science because of its social process nature).
20 See generally Schlegel, supra note 18.
21 See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURTAT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (stating that judicial review should be used sparingly); CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND TIE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1960) (stating that
judicial review legitimates legislative acts); 'JESSE H. CHOI'ER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND TIHE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980)
(outlining a functional argument for judicial review); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980) (stating that judicial review should foster majority government and protect
individual rights); HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip Frickey eds., 1994) (providing a general statement of the legal process school); Lon
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (arguing that the form
of adjudication limits its functions).
22 For the classic statement of this idea, see Fuller, supra note 21, at 372 ("Courts can be
counted on to make a reasoned disposition of controversies, either by the application of statutes
or treaties, or in the absence of these sources, by the development of rules appropriate to the
cases before them and derived from general principles of fairness and equity.").
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between two parties regarding the interpretation of a rule are prop-
erly assigned to the judiciary.2  This argument had the great virtue of
conceding the now-virtually unassailable point that legal doctrine is
subordinate to politics, yet defining an area of government decision
making where doctrine remained determinative and relatively
autonomous. 4 It thus rehabilitated the sort of doctrinal analysis that
formed the core of legal scholarship, providing it an independent,
albeit circumscribed, range of operation.
During the 197 0s and 1980s, legal process was subjected to a sus-
tained attack. Since then, however, it has been resuscitated by a
movement generally described as new legal process, and it is this
movement, clearly one of the most important in contemporary schol-
arship, that explains why the question of whether a particular task
should be performed by courts still brings legal process analysis to
mind. The dominant criticism of legal process, and the one that led
to its need for its resuscitation, was its failure to recognize that legisla-
tures, agencies and courts are all political actors. Legal process
scholars assumed that government officials were all public-oriented,
that their primary goal was to devise optimal solutions to policy prob-
lems and that the choice between them could thus be made on the
basis of their institutional capacity alone. Courts, in Lon Fuller's
view, would experience difficulty solving polycentric problems be-
cause all the parties affected by the solution to the problem would
not be present in court, and all the information necessary to solve the
problem would not be available to the judge.25 The legislature was a
preferable decision maker in this situation, Fuller thought, because
these sources of information would be available. Legislatures, Hart
and Sacks declared, are generally "made up of reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. ""2 6 Similarly, where institu-
tional considerations favored judicial resolution, legal process schol-
ars assumed that the judiciary would be able to take advantage of
those considerations to reach public-oriented results.
Both law and economics and critical legal studies challenged these
comfortable assertions. The law and economics movement was based
on rational actor theory, and thus incorporated public choice, which
is the rational actor theory's approach to politics. According to this
theory, elected officials, being rational actors like everyone else, are
primarily motivated by the desire to maximize their individual self-
23 See, e.g., id. at 394-405 (providing a discussion of polycentric issues and problems of adju-
dication).
2 Id. at 404-05.
2 d. at 399-400.
26 HART & SACKS, supra note 21, at 1415. This well-known statement was made in the context
of what a court interpreting a statute should assume, but it was stated as a plausible approxima-
tion, not a counterfactual one to be believed for reasons other than its validity.
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interest. This means that legislators and the chief executive will try to
maximize their chances of being re-elected and thereby retain their
desirable positions, 7 while administrators will attempt to maximize
the budget of their agencies," or perhaps their individual discretion. '
The Critical Legal Studies movement (hereinafter "CLS"), loosely
based on neo-Marxist or post-Marxist analysis,30 viewed public officials
as acting to preserve the position and privileges of the upper class.
Critical race theory and feminist theory, as successors to CLS, offered
parallel arguments that public officials were acting to preserve the
privileged position of whites, or males, and ignoring or suppressing
more broadly based claims for equality]
New legal process represents an effort to resuscitate the legal
process school analysis in light of this critique. Abandoning the as-
sumption that public officials are all public-oriented, it attempts to
incorporate both the public choice insight that these officials are mo-
tivated by individual self-interest and the CLS insight that they are
motivated by class bias. In the view of new legal process scholars,
these insights do not alter the basic contours of the problem that the
legal process school originally addressed. 3' Government will still ex-
27 See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (stating that par-
ties tailor policies to maximize votes); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989) (arguing that legislators' votes reflect desire to be
re-elected); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD AND TI-E
THEORYOF GROUPS (1965) (stating that free rider effects mean that many interest- are not rep-
resented).
29 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN,JR., BUREAUCRACYAND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 39-41 (1971).
9 Jean-Luc Migu6 & Gdrard B61anger, Toward a General Theory of Managerial Discretion, 17
PUB. CIIOICE 27 (1974).
M The most notable school of neo-Marxist or post-Marxist analysis would be the Frankfurt
School. See generally THEODOR W. ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS (E.B. Ashton trans., 1973)
(1966) (proposing a negative dialectics method to advance German philosophy); MARTIN JAY,
THE DIALECTIC IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND TIHE INSTITUTE OF
SOCIAL RESEARCH 1923-1950 (1973); MAX HORKI-EIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, THE
DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (John Cumming trans., 1987); HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE
DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964) (cri-
tiquing the modern industrial society's equating of technological rationality and poltical ration-
ality); ROLF WIGGERSHAUS, TIlE FRANKFURT SCHOOL: ITS HISTORY, THEORIES AND POLITICAL
SIGNIFICANCE (Michael Robertson trans., 1994) (1986).
31 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) (analyzing male dominance
and fenale submission in the law); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal The-
ory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (merging race with feminist legal theory). For discussions of
feminist legal theories in light of critical legal studies, see Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Feminist
Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or the Fem-Crits Go to School, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 61 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990) (ana-
lyzing the alliance and tension between feminist legal theory and CLS); Robin West, Deconstruct-
ing the CLS-Feminist Split, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S L. 85 (1986).
12 See, e.g., NEAL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (using economic analysis to fit function with form); Wil-
liam N. Eskridge,Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Inter-
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ist, self-interested and biased though its officials may be; indeed, the
same public choice and CLS insights that undermine the asserted
neutrality of government provide strong empirical evidence that the
government will not retreat from exercising its control over society.
Given this continued control, decisions must be made by one institu-
tion or another. Thus, the legal process effort to determine which
institution is in the best position to make these decisions remains an
important one.
But that determination is not nearly as easy as the original legal
process school assumed; it must take into account a much more
complex motivation structure. In particular, it must take into ac-
count the desire of chief executives and legislators to be re-elected,
the particularized motivations of administrators, the class biases of all
officials and a variety of other motivations, which may be of less inter-
est to public choice and CLS because they are not a source of cyni-
cism, but which are nonetheless important. Because public choice
and CLS are both essentially interdisciplinary movements, the new
legal process' incorporation of their insights also represents a partial
incorporation of social science into legal scholarship.33 It thus cap-
tures the greatest methodological virtue of legal realism and reme-
dies the greatest methodological defect of legal process. It manages
to reassert, once more, the coherence of law as a field of scholarly
endeavor without succumbing to the disciplinary insulation that
marred prior efforts to achieve this goal.
Some characteristic works of the new legal process school illus-
trate the nature of its analysis, and the reason for its continued rele-
vance to the question of whether courts should be public policy mak-
ers. In Imperfect Alternatives, Neil Komesar argues that the regulation
of social systems can be implemented by politics, that is, the executive
and legislature, by the market or by the courts. 4 As his title suggests,
each alternative has its disadvantages; the political branches are sub-
ject to special interest group pressures, the market generates exten-
sive transaction costs, while litigation is expensive and courts are
crowded. It is a bit unfair to his subtle and innovative analysis to say
that he differs from the original legal process school by asking which
institution is the least worst in a given situation, rather than asking
which institution is the best, but that characterization does capture
the fact that Komesar pursues the inquiry about comparative institu-
pretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988) (arguing that public choice theory subjects different types of
legislation to different levels of review).
33 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
IN'TRODUCTION (1991) (examining the influence of rational choice theories in public law schol-
arship).
." See generally KOMESAR, supra note 32.
35 Id
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tional competence without any reliance on the claim that institutions
have purely public-oriented motivations. '
William Eskridge, in an article entitled Politics Without Romance,
grounds part of his theory of statutory interpretation on the type of
legislation that the court is interpreting.:7 Using the public choice
analysis of the diffusion or concentration of both costs and benefits, 
3
Eskridge argues that the political process is the most reliable when
statutes involving diffuse costs and diffuse benefits are at issue, be-
cause the majoritarian political process will operate."' It is the least
reliable in connection with statutes that involve concentrated costs
and benefits, or diffuse costs and concentrated benefits, because spe-
cial interests will tend to dominate."' Courts, therefore, should inter-
pret the latter type of statute more stringently. In effect, Eskridge
recommends that decision making authority should be shifted from
legislatures to courts when such statutes are involved, or, to put the
point in new legal process terms, that legislatures are less competent
to make decisions in these situations, and courts, by virtue of their in-
sulation from politics, possess a comparative institutional advantage.
A final example is Cass Sunstein's article, Leaving Things Unde-
cided." Sunstein counsels the Supreme Court to avoid issuing defini-
tive decisions in a variety of circumstances so that other political
branches and social processes have more latitude to address the is-
sue.42 The article naturally brings to mind one of the classics of the
original legal process school, Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous
Branch, in which Bickel argues that the Court, being "counter-
majoritarian," should use the "passive virtues" to avoid decision and
allow the political process to function."' This book has been so as-
siduously attacked since its publication that it justifies the mixed
metaphor of being called a magnet, rather than a target, for criticism.
Two of the leading criticisms, reflecting both public choice and CLS
concerns, are that the political branches are not reliably majori-
tarian,'' and that the Court cannot be trusted to engage in such stra-
%, Id.
37 Eskridge, supra note 32, at 319-24.
38 This analysis also plays a prominent role in Komesar's book. See KOMESAR, supra note 32,
at 123-38.
3 Eskridge, supra note 32, at 278-79.
Id. at 284-85.
41 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1996).
42 Id. at 10-28.
4. See BICKEL, supra note 21, at 116-23. The passive virtues include among others, the powers
to decline jurisdiction, to avoid issues for lack of ripeness, to decide issues on procedural
grounds and to awake the political question doctrine. Id. at 111-98.
See Barry Friedman, Dialogue andJudicial Review, 91 MiCF. L. REV. 577, 587 (1993) ("[l]n a
representative system like our own majority rule is purely a question of degree."); Richard H.
Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism,
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tegic behavior on behalf of higher principle.4 Sunstein incorporates
these criticisms by grounding his recommendation on participatory
democracy, rather than majoritarianism. In his analysis, the Court is
not required to manipulate the legal process with the skill of a maes-
tro at his violin, but only recognize when it has gotten itself into deep
and muddy waters. It does not defer to some ideal majoritarian deci-
sion maker, but to the complex interplay of government officials, in-
terest groups and public opinion that constitutes the essence of our
political process. Perhaps most significantly, Sunstein's deference is
not a strategy designed to produce an optimal solution, but an effort
to preserve the process by which society feels its way through an un-
certain situation to an unknown outcome.
B. The Discourse and Audience of New Legal Process
The new legal process school thus appears to offer a convincing
solution to the issue of judicial policy making and the desirability of
litigation against the government. Like its predecessor, it counsels
that the courts should make public policy only when they possess
some identifiable institutional advantage in doing so over the execu-
tive and legislature. In contrast to its predecessor, however, new legal
process incorporates a much more complex and defensible analysis
of the rival institutions and, to a more limited extent, of the courts
themselves. It would appear to lead to a somewhat expanded role for
courts, because it recognizes many more institutional disadvantages
of the political branches, specifically their ideological biases and their
vulnerability to interest group pressure. At the same time, it ac-
knowledges the ideological biases of the courts themselves, and thus
restricts this expansion to a relatively narrow compass.
There is, however, a complex issue lurking just below the surface
of this analysis that at least partially undermines its coherence, and
leads to somewhat different conclusions. Legal scholarship, for the
most part, is normative, that is, its discursive voice is to offer recom-
mendations to legal decision makers about the way to perform their
assigned task in an optimal manner. There is, of course, descriptive
legal scholarship, such as legal history or legal sociology, but the work
that constitutes the major portion of the field, and that gives it a dis-
tinctive voice, is essentially prescriptive. The assumption that under-
lies this approach is that the decision maker thus addressed is capable
and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990) (articulating the limits of social choice
theory).
4, See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" A Comment on Principle and Ex-
pediency infJudicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (criticizing Bickel's thesis for being attrac-
tive but lethal).
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of listening. This is a theoretical assumption, not an empirical one.
There is no requirement that actual decision makers in fact attend to
legal scholarship; the scholarship is primarily directed to other schol-
ars, and its influence on society is measured by criteria other than di-
rect impacts on particular decision makers. What is required is that
the decision makers being addressed could conceivably follow the
recommendations, that they are the sort of people to whom such
recommendations would make sense. It is the theoretical possibility
of a response, not its actuality, that establishes the conditions for the
discursive voice that legal scholarship adopts. This frees the scholarly
discourse from any crude dependence on direct influence, but raises
two further questions that are not as readily resolved. First, what kind
of decision maker is being addressed, and second, what is the particu-
lar role of this decision maker?
Current debate, not only in legal scholarship but in social science
and psychology as well, centers on whether decision makers, or peo-
ple in general, are instrumentally rational, ideological, principled,
emotional, or irrational. Public choice, being derived from rational
actor theory, argues that people are instrumentally rational, by which
it means that they will adopt behaviors designed to maximize their
individual self-interest, and that they will generally adopt the behavior
best designed to do so, subject to cognitive and informational limits.
CLS, being loosely derived from Marxism, argues that people are
ideological and will adopt behaviors designed to benefit their social
class. The legal process belief that decision makers act reasonably,
that is, to advance the public interest, is based on the idea that people
are motivated by principle, or alternatively, by the desire to acquit
themselves well in the performance of their assigned tasks. Surpris-
ingly, given the methodological naivete of the legal process school,
this conclusion garners strong support among social scientists,
whether they view it as a dominant motivation, as do Erving Goff-
man, 4 Harold Garfinke 47 and Pierre Bourdieu, " or whether they see
it as mixed with ideological motivations, as do Anthony Giddens" and
Robert Merton.8 In recent years, however, it has been challenged by
46 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER
(1971); ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR (1967);
ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER
INMATES (1961).
47 See generally HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETI-INOMETHODOLOGY (1967).
48 See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMOACADEMIUS (1988).
49 See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE
LATE MODERN AGE (1991); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE
THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1984) (asserting that a structuration theory of social science can
help establish and validate "generalizations" such as laws).
50 See generally ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1968).
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Antonio Damasio,5 ' Robert Frank and Robert Shiller,"3 among oth-
ers, who have emphasized the motivational role of the emotions, and
by cognitive psychology and new institutional sociology, which em-
phasize various forms of irrationality.
The normative focus of legal scholarship is to frame recommenda-
tions that will benefit society in general. When a legal scholar argues
that a case should be decided, a statute drafted or a policy enforced
in a particular way, she is arguing that her recommended mode of ac-
tion would benefit society as a whole. In order to combine this nor-
mative focus with the discursive practice of addressing government
decision makers, she must assume that these decision makers are
principled, or public oriented. It is only under this assumption that
their motivations will align with general social benefit. This assump-
tion, of course, is the one that the legal process school adopted. The
ability to align the legal scholar's public orientation with their tradi-
tional discursive voice was a major reason for the legal process
school's original success, and a major reason for its subsequent re-
vival. The revived legal process school acknowledges self-interested
and ideological motivations, and its methodological sophistication is
much greater than its predecessor, but it has been able to draw sup-
port for its assumption from other disciplines, and use that perspec-
tive to contain the insights that public choice and CLS allowed to
dominate all other considerations.
To illustrate the normative focus of legal scholarship, one can
contrast the field with a body of legal writing that has a different au-
dience, and, as a result, a different focus. This is the variety of arti-
cles, treatises and form books that tell practicing lawyers how to win a
case, or more generally, how to do their job in an effective manner.
The topics of these two bodies of legal writing, while not identical,
overlap to a considerable extent. There are both scholarly articles
and practitioner manuals that deal with the Civil Rights Act,54 the
Clean Air Act," the Truth in Lending Act," and the decisional law of
torts or trusts. But lawyers, unlike government decision makers, are
not supposed to act in a manner that benefits the public; they are
supposed to act to benefit their client. Legal writing directed toward
them, therefore, can be just as prescriptive as writing directed toward
5, See generally ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF Wli[AT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN
THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1999); ANTONIO R. DAMASio, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION,
REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994) (positing emotions and feelings are integral to reason).
2 See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE
QUEST FOR STATUS (1986).
53 See generally ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000).
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1995).
55 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (1990).
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1615 (1968).
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officials, but the prescriptions will not be designed to tell the audi-
ence how to maximize the public good; they will be designed to tell
the audience, that is, practicing lawyers, how to win their case or ne-
gotiate an advantageous deal. In Habermas' terms, they are written
in strategic discourse, not communicative discourse. This difference
in prescriptive stance, resulting from a difference in audience, is suf-
ficient to distinguish the two bodies of legal writing. To put the mat-
ter most simply, legal writing whose audience is lawyers is simply not
considered scholarship. Law professors sometimes write practitioner
treatises, or articles directed to practitioners, but these works are not
considered legal scholarship. They are not cited by scholars, except
occasionally as evidence of attorney attitudes, and they do not con-
tribute to a scholar's reputation. An assistant professor at any major
law school whose tenure file consisted entirely of practitioner-
directed work would be denied promotion. Standard scholarship is
designed to benefit society in general, and must thus be directed to
public-oriented decision makers.
But precisely which decision makers are being addressed by this
scholarship? Traditionally, legal scholarship was addressed to the
courts. Legal realists, particularly to the extent that they incorpo-
rated social science methodology, sometimes departed from this ap-
proach and spoke in generally descriptive terms, but this reflected
the unsatisfactory character of their work to which the legal process
school responded. Part of the appeal of the legal process school re-
sided in its ability to restore the normative voice that the legal realism
had partially undermined. Once the realist assertion thatjudges were
deciding cases on the basis of whim, inherited mythology or personal
psychology was rejected, and their public-oriented motivation was re-
asserted, legal scholars could return to their traditional pattern and
address recommendations to judges in public-oriented terms.
Law and economics and CLS, although they cast themselves as a
general attack on the legal process school, left this mode of discourse
relatively unscathed. The public choice analysis that accompanied
law and economics mounted a convincing attack on the legal process
assumption that legislatures consist of "reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably;' ', 7 instead, public choice scholars in-
sisted, the legislators are trying to maximize their chance of re-
election. CLS mounted an equally convincing attack on the ground
that legislators were trying to implement particular political ideolo-
gies. Indeed, the current debate in political science is between these
two views, not between either view and some standard of reasonable-
ness.
57 HART & SACKS, supra note 21, at 1415.
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But while both movements were prepared to abandon the behav-
ioral assumptions that legal process made regarding legislators, they
were not willing to do so with respect to judges. Public choice-
oriented legal scholars were notably shy about ascribing self-
interested motivations to judges, although a few halfhearted attempts
have been made. In most cases, these scholars simply assumed that
judges could act in the public interest, perhaps because the constitu-
tional rules regarding job tenure and salary protection5' had insulated
them sufficiently from the need to take action to preserve their posi-
tions . As a result these scholars frequently continued to cast their
work as recommendations to judges about the proper way to decide
cases. What gave this work its law and economics orientation was that
the scholars recommended that judges decide on the basis of effi-
ciency. In addition, when interpreting statutes or administrative ac-
tions, judges were counseled to take the self-interested motivations of
these officials into account. But law and economics scholars assumed
that the judges could be addressed with such public-oriented recom-
mendations, that judges would decide on the basis of efficiency, or
take legislative motivations into account because these considerations
would produce the best policy for the nation as a whole.
CLS scholars were not at all shy about applying their analysis to
judges. They argued that judges, like elected officials, would carry
out their assigned functions to systematically suppress the claims of
economically disadvantaged groups. The result is that judicially cre-
ated legal doctrine, like statutes or executive decisions, would be de-
signed to preserve the economic status quo and to reject claims that
would lead to social reform and economic justice. Having reached
this conclusion, however, the CLS response was to continue address-
ing arguments to judges in the hope of shaming them into abandon-
ing their class biases and deciding cases on the basis of the principles
that they asserted, rather than class interest. This was the source of
the CLS turn to French deconstruction, a theory which has no inher-
ent political orientation, but can be used to reveal contradiction and
58 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 117-18 (1995) (suggesting that popularity,
prestige and public interest can motivate judicial actions); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Independent Judiciaiy in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (as-
serting competitive parties, among other factors, foster judicial independence); William F.
Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Interest Groups and the Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 953, 963
(1998) ("Completely 'selfless' models ofjudicial behavior are plainly nonscientific.").
19 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
60 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (recom-
mending thatjudges should interpret statutes to implement the bargain established by the leg-
islature, on the assumption that judges would be motivated to do so rather than acting to pre-
serve their jobs); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV 223 (1986) (recommending thatjudges
should interpret statutes to make them more public oriented).
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self-delusion in the theory being observed. In other words, CLS pre-
served the traditional discourse of legal scholarship by assuming that
judges, although reflecting the same class-bias as legislators, could
nonetheless be persuaded to abandon those biases by reasoned ar-
gument. Critical race theory and feminist theory make the same as-
sumption. Instead of using deconstruction, however, they use the
more familiar methodology of pointing out the internal contradic-
tions between our government's stated principles and its actual per-
formance. They can do this because racial and gender equality can
be derived from indigenous American principles, such as equality of
opportunity, but class equality cannot be.
New legal process scholars have been able to build on this belief,
which is central to the discourse of legal scholarship and essentially
unchallenged by the otherwise virulent critics of the original legal
process school, thatjudges are public-oriented decision makers. As a
result, they can continue to address public-oriented prescriptions to
judges, not necessarily because the judges are expected to respond
directly, but because judges are the sorts of public officials for whom
a discourse of this sort makes sense. The works by Komesar, Eskridge
and Sunstein cited above are all based on this premise; all address the
judge, in whole or part, and all adopt a public-oriented prescriptive
discourse. As stated above, these works incorporate many of the pub-
lic choice or CLS insights about the complex motivation structure of
executive and legislative officials and avoid the Panglossian simplicity
of the original legal process school. They might even concede, al-
though this is not made explicit, that judges can be subject to simi-
larly complex motivations. But they assume that judges are suffi-
ciently public-oriented so that a prescriptive, public oriented
discourse can be addressed to them. In other words, they assume
that judges have some interest in optimal, public-oriented decision
making. This is an entirely plausible assumption and, as stated, it can
draw support from much of modern sociology. It is, however, an as-
sumption, and the new legal process analysis of comparative institu-
tional competence is dependent on it, and bound by its limitations.
C. The Dilemma of New Legal Process Analysis
Consider the dilemma of a conscientious federal judge, con-
fronted with a prison reform case in the late 1960s when the judicial
reform effort was just getting underway. The judge believes, as al-
most every reasonable person does today, that the conditions in
American prisons at that time, and particularly in Southern prisons,
are morally offensive and in need of reform. Following the analysis of
new legal process, or indeed the old legal process that still prevailed
at the time, the judge also believes that he is not the proper decision
maker to reform the prisons. The comparative institutional advan-
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tage lies with the legislature, which can hold hearings, authorize
wide-ranging investigations, freely obtain advice from recognized
prison experts and allocate resources, while balancing those resource
expenditures against other priorities such as education, housing and
crime prevention. If the legislature is uncertain about particular
strategies, it can defer the choice of those strategies to the adminis-
trative agencies that it will authorize to implement its program. The
judge, according to legal process analysis, cannot do any of these
things, and is reduced to dealing with the complex, polycentric prob-
lem of prison reform in the context of an adversarial lawsuit.
The dilemma is that the legislature and executive are disinclined
to act. This is often the occasion for legal process scholars to rec-
ommend judicial action, but the basis of that recommendation must
be some institutional disability on the part of the reluctant institu-
tions that indicates a structural defect in our majoritarian political
system. Such structural defects are identified by what is known
among constitutional law scholars as The Footnote, that is, footnote
four of the majority opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co"6
These defects are the existence of a "discrete and insular minority,"
such as African-Americans, who is not able to participate fully in the
political process because other groups will not ally with it, or because
the denial of a fundamental right, such as the right to vote, disables
political participation. In either case, the political branches fail in
their representative functions, and the courts can validly intercede.
The structural defect eliminates the comparative institutional advan-
tage that formerly belonged to legislature and executive, and gives
the politically insulated court the comparative advantage in their
place.
But prisoners are not a discrete and insular minority. They have
not acquired their identity by birth or some other factor beyond their
control. They are prisoners because they violated duly promulgated
laws, and were convicted in accordance with the dictates of due proc-
ess. Nor are the rights that they are claiming, and were ultimately
granted, fundamental rights. Certain rights that prisoners claim,
such as the right of access to a lawyer or a law library have this chaeac-
ter, but these rights, although sometimes violated, were not the ones
at issue in the prison conditions cases . The real issue in the cases
61 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (noting that discrimination against a discrete and insular minor-
ity might elevate scrutiny).
62 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (holding that the fundamental constitutional
right of access to courts requires authorities to assist inmates in preparation and filing of legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or assistance from legally trained per-
sons); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (invalidating state prison regulation preventing
inmates from assisting illiterate or poorly educated prisoners with habeas corpus petitions);
Wainwright v. Coonts, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969) (invalidating prison regulation prohibiting
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involved the totality of their treatment-food, medical care, living
conditions, discipline-and was unrelated to the political or legal
process. The overarching point is that the manner in which criminals
are punished cannot be viewed as a breakdown in the political proc-
ess; instead, it is a basic function of the political process. To declare
that the political process in a democratic society is defective in decid-
ing how to punish those who violate its laws is to reject democracy as
a form of government, for punishment, which goes back to the Code
of Hammurabi, is perhaps the oldest and most characteristic form of
government activity.
These political considerations are connected to more technical
consideration about institutional competence. Institutions in the le-
gal process view, and certainly in the new legal process view, are de-
signed by human beings for particular purposes. Thus, an institution
such as the executive or legislature that is designed to respond to po-
litical demands will be given capabilities that are consonant with
those demands, specifically the capability to make new public policy.
In contrast, an institution such as the judiciary, that is designed to de-
termine whether particular cases fit within the categories established
by an existing policy, will not be given policy making capabilities, but
rather the capabilities needed for interpreting and applying a prevail-
ing rule. When the courts stray beyond their proper limits and take
over a task assigned to one of the political branches, they not only in-
terfere with the process of majoritarian decision making, but they
also do a poor job with the task they have arrogated to themselves. 3
The proverbial fish out of water, they cannot function in an area for
which they were not designed.
Thus, legal process suggests that the legislature and executive, not
the courts, are the optimal decision makers regarding prison condi-
tions. These are the institutions that are competent to address the
prisoners from assisting other inmates with legal preparation). See also Raymond V. Lin, A Pris-
oner's Constitutional Right to Attorney Assistance, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1279 (1983) (summarizing the
scope of prisoners' right of access to lawyers). But see Lewis v. Casey 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (limit-
ing prisoners' access to legal materials). For a discussion of reductions-but not elimination-of
these rights, see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 380-88. The prison conditions cases were
much more sweeping in scope and in many instances resettled in orders that placed entire
prison systems under the continuous and sustained supervision of federal judges. See, e.g., Holt
v. Sarver (Holt I), 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (holding, for the first time, that an Arkan-
sas prison failed to discharge its constitutional duty to protect inmates and that the conditions
of cells and facilities constituted cruel and unusual punishment). See generally FEELEY & RUBIN,
supra note 1, at 51-144 (providing a number of case studies and comparisons).
63 Because legal process analysis so often combines these two considerations, it is worth em-
phasizing that they are not the same thing. Both an elementary school student and Shaquille
O'Neal are forbidden to play college basketball because they would disrupt the jurisdictional
niles that define the field, but the elementary school student would also impair the perform-
ance of the college team, while Shaquille would not.
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issue, and there is no recognizable political breakdown, as defined by
legal process, that would preclude them from doing so. The problem
is that the legislature and the executive are not acting, that the gro-
tesquely inhuman conditions in the prisons continue year after year,
and there is no other decision maker on the scene who is willing to
intervene. Under these circumstances, the judge may reason thus: "I
may not be the optimal decision maker in this situation, but I am bet-
ter than nothing. The situation demands action from someone. I
may not be able to do as good ajob as the political branches can do
in theory, but I can certainly do a better job in reality, since these
branches aren't acting at all." It may not be possible to reconstruct
the mental process of the federal judges who decided the prison re-
form cases, but the language and substance of their opinions suggest
that this is exactly the way they thought.
If this is the case, however, it creates both substantive and meth-
odological difficulties for the new legal process school. With respect
to substance, one of the defining elements in new legal process is
comparative institutional analysis, the inquiry into the particular insti-
tution that is best suited to solve a particular problem. It would be
easy enough to condemn the federal judges who decided the prison
cases on the basis of this approach, to declare that they should not
have acted because they were not the optimal institutional decision
maker. But this response is troublesome. Serious abuses of human
rights were being perpetrated in our nation, and the courts possessed
the authority and ability to intervene. The executive and legislature
might have been able to resolve the problem more effectively, but
they were not taking action, and there was no realistic likelihood that
they would do so in the foreseeable future.
Perhaps the courts should have desisted and waited for the politi-
cal branches to acknowledge their optimal institutional capacities.
There were indeed some state initiated efforts to reform the prisons, 4
and Congress did enact the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act of 1980"' (CRIPA), but the failure of the state-level efforts, the
nonenforcement of CRIPA by the executive, ' '" and Congress' subse-
C4 See MARK T. CARLETON, POLITIcS AND PUNISHMENT: TiE HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA STATE
PENAL SYSTEM 151-79 (1971) (summarizing over one hundred years of the evolution of the Lou-
isiana prison system); Malcolm M. Feeley, The Significance of Prison Conditions Cases: Budgets and
Regions, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 273 (1989) (stating that budgets for Southern prisons under court
order increased faster than the national average).
65 Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a-1997j
(1996)). CRIPA provided for the promulgation of national standards for prison conditions
drawn largely from those of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and authorized the Department of
Justice to bring suit in federal court against state prison systems that failed to meet those stan-
dards.
W See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 381-82 (describing the lack of enforcement by the
Department ofJustice tinder the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations).
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quent passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 67 which
severely limited judicial reform efforts, suggest that the courts would
have been waiting a long, long time. To recommend such forbear-
ance would have left generations of prisoners suffering under condi-
tions that virtually everyone in this country recognizes as inhuman,
and that virtually no one would choose to re-institute. The recom-
mendation, moreover, ignores theyphenomenological position of the
federal judges. There they were. The injustices were obvious, no
one else was taking action, and they were in a position to do so. Was
it really conscionable to desist on the fairly abstract ground that an-
other institution could do a better job, if only it were willing to do
that job, which it wasn't? Would we really want the kind of people
who would make such arguments populating the federal judiciary?
The second difficulty that the judge's dilemma creates for the new
legal process movement is methodological, as opposed to substantive.
Like most legal scholarship, new legal process adopts a mode of dis-
course that addresses recommendations to government officials on
public-oriented grounds. Arguments that courts should defer to the
political branches in circumstances where they are not the best insti-
tutional decision maker are naturally addressed to the judiciary, the
most common audience for legal scholarship in general. But pre-
cisely what should the scholar say to a judge who acknowledges that
she is not the best decision maker, but argues that she is the best
available, since the theoretically superior institutions have refused to
act? It would be easy enough to condemn the judge, on comparative
institutional grounds, but that seems to undervalue the rather con-
vincing moral position that she can assert in favor of her intervention.
To endorse this intervention, however, appears to allow strategic con-
siderations into the analysis, and thereby to undermine the theoreti-
cal basis for the discourse. The scholar then is adopting the voice of
a policy advocate for a particular position, and seeking the best strat-
67 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1328-66 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997). The Act fol-
lows a similar, btut more limited effort, as the Helms Amendment to the Violent Crime Control
and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1827 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act prohibits federal courts from ordering changes in prisons
and jails unless the court first finds that an inmate's federal rights have been violated, .and then
requires that the relief be narrowly drawn and employ the least intrusive means to correct the
violation. Court orders ordering relief must be terminated after two years unless the court
makes an affirmative finding that the relief still meets the required conditions. Consent de-
crees, as well as court-ordered relief, must conform to the required conditions. The Act was
specifically designed to restrict judicial prison reform efforts.
68 See generally EDMUND HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS 53, 116-17 (Dorion Cairns trans.,
1993); Id. at 17 ("[T]his life is continually there for me. Continually, in respect of a field of the
present, it is given to conscious perceptuality .... ) (emphasis in original); EDMUND HUSSERL,




egy for achieving that position at a given time. He is setting the sig-
nificance of the political opposition to prison reform at naught, with
no explicit rationale for doing so, and trying to circumvent that op-
position by appealing to the sensibilities of the judiciary. A discourse
of this sort seems to abandon the entire project of comparative insti-
tutional analysis for the very different project of seeking the institu-
tion that will best enable a particular political actor to achieve its
purpose.
Another way to state this methodological dilemma is to note that
scholarship endorsing the judge's assessment of the political situation
appears difficult to distinguish from writing that directs recommen-
dations to a prison reform advocate. There is some published legal
literature of this sort and, in any case, it is easy to imagine. It would
begin from an unquestioned premise that the prisons need to be re-
formed and then assess various strategies that advocates could use to
achieve this objective. Quite plausibly, it could observe that there was
no political support for prison reform in the executive and legislative
branches, and that the judiciary was the most promising alternative.
As noted above, however, practitioner-oriented writing of this sort is
not considered legal scholarship; the reason is that it does not take a
broad-based, public-oriented perspective, but rather offers strategic
advice to one particular participant, representing one particular
point of view.
We can now return to the original inquiry. In assessing whether
litigation against the government is socially desirable as a means of
regulating our society, it is necessary to determine whether we want
courts to make public policy. The comparative institutional analysis
of the legal process school appears to be the most natural way for le-
gal scholars to approach this question. Legal process has dominated
legal scholarship for the last fifty years, nearly as long as legal formal-
ism and legal realism combined. It was subjected to a spirited attack
by law and economics and CLS, but it has rallied to reassert itself as
the leading, albeit not exclusive, approach. Comparative institutional
analysis is arguably the single most important theme in the legal
process school, and the role of courts in relation to the politically ac-
countable branches is certainly the most important application of this
theme. But the prison conditions cases suggest two serious difficul-
ties with this widely endorsed approach."6 First, it does not seem to
speak to the real situation that often faces real judges; it seems insen-
sitive to the moral demand for action that they perceive in critical
situations involving human rights or other serious concerns. Second,
any effort to adapt it to this purpose appears to undermine the
69 See cases and discussion infra note 62.
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methodology that underlies most legal scholarship, and certainly the
legal process school.
II. A REVISED LEGAL PROCESS ANALYSIS OFJUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
A. From Institutions to Methodologies
One way to preserve the valuable insights of new legal process,
while addressing the real concerns of judges in situations such as the
prison conditions cases,"' is to relax the requirement of optimality.
Rather than asking whether a particular institution is the optimal
choice in a given situation, the scholar would ask whether that institu-
tion is an adequate choice. Thus, ajudge, when faced with a morally
compelling issue, would begin by asking the legal process question of
whether there was another institution that could optimally address
the issue. If she concluded that there was such an institution, how-
ever, this would not conclude her inquiry. She would then ask
whether there was a realistic possibility that this optimal institution
would address the issue in the foreseeable future. If she concluded
that there was no such possibility, she would then ask whether the
courts would be pretty good at addressing the issue, even though they
were not optimal. If the answer to this latter question was yes, she
would proceed.
An approach of this sort bears some relationship to the economic
concept of the second best, to Herbert Simon's concept of satis-• 7"1• •,,72
ficing and to Charles Lindblom's idea of "muddling through•. The
purpose of these concepts is to factor some of the limitations inher-
ent in real human situations into the optimality analysis of economics
or public policy. Real-world decision makers may be daunted by the
complexities of subjecting every available alternative to a full cost-
benefit analysis, and may prefer to consider a more limited range of
options, accepting the possibility that they may overlook the best op-
tion so long as they can find one that is satisfactory.7" This suggestion
has proven controversial, particularly in economics, because most
economic analysis is grounded on the principle of maximization.
The objection is less relevant to policy analysis, where maximization is
70 hM.
71 See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS xxvii (2d ed. 1957).
72 See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959)
(contrasting successive limited comparisons, the likely method of administrative decision mak-





a much vaguer notion, and still less relevant to legal scholarship,
where it plays a relatively minor role.
Nonetheless, the comparative institutional analysis of legal process
relies on the idea of optimality, and it may appear that relaxing this
requirement would undermine the entire approach. What is left, af-
ter all, if the new legal process scholar no longer tries to determine
whether the institution in question is the optimal one to make a par-
ticular decision, and asks only whether it is pretty good at doing so?
How many times would this irresolute approach ever possess dis-
criminating power; how many times would it actually counsel a public
official against doing what he wants? Perhaps a sufficiently developed
legal process analysis could plausibly be seen as able to convince a
government decision maker that he was not the optimal person to
make a given decision, but would it ever be possible to convince that
he would not at least be pretty good?
At the technical level of institutional capability, the answer to this
quandary lies in the distinction between institutions and decision
making styles. While new legal process, benefiting from both law and
economics and CLS, has developed a more sociologically sophisti-
cated approach to institutions than its predecessor, it has failed to re-
vise at least one major element of legal process naivet6. This is the
categorical approach to institutions, the tendency to treat them as
monolithic and unselfconscious. Courts possess one style of decision
making, reasoned argument, and are not capable of altering or modi-
fying this approach. Legislatures possess another style, polycentric
policy making, that is similarly uniform and unalterable. Thus, the
choice between institutions, according to the legal process school, is
identical to the choice between decision making styles, and the two
choices can be treated as equivalent. The origin of this view is not
difficult to discern; it is the separation of powers concept that legal
process scholars believed to be embedded in the Constitution.74 In
fact, the textual support for this principle is thin and, as we argued in
our book, the justification for it in a modem administrative state is
highly questionable. For present purposes, the important point is
that the separation of powers principle, whether or not it is constitu-
tionally required, loomed so large in the thinking of the original legal
process scholars that it distorted their view of institutions.
74 The leading modern statements of this position are BICKEL, supra note 21, and Fuller, su-
pra note 21, at 377-78 (discussing the inherent principles which will make federalism work).
75 FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 326-27.
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Legal process was undoubtedly correct to draw attention to vary-
ing institutional capabilities in making decisions, but its proponents
overstated their case in their effort to establish it. Complex institu-
tions like Congress or the federal judiciary, to say nothing of the en-
tire executive or administrative apparatus, act in a wide variety of dif-
ferent ways and regularly reassess their modes of action. Confronted
with a particular problem, they may well react in ways that display
much greater similarities than the categorical analysis of legal process
would suggest. Thus, to allocate a decision to a given institution is
not necessarily to choose a particular decision making style. The dif-
ference between institutional performances will rarely be the differ-
ence between stellar quality and total incapacity, but rather will be
measured in subtle gradations of ability.
There are several important reasons why the reactions of different
institutions to a particular problem might overlap, rather than di-
verge. First, the complex institutions of a modern administrative
state display a wide range of capacities and modes of action. To be-
gin with the most obvious example, administrative agencies combine
all three of the functions that are traditionally regarded as being
characteristic of the three branches of government; they make policy,
often by means of regulations that are functionally indistinguishable
from legislation, they implement policy, the legislature's or their own,
and they adjudicate the legal status of individuals under a prevailing
policy. This is one of the features of modern government that indi-
cates the obsolescence of the separation of powers concept, as it is
virtually inconceivable that the combination of powers in the admin-
istrative agency could be eliminated. It creates an inherent ambiguity
in the comparative institutional analysis of legal process, since it
means that there is no particular category of decision that lies outside
the core functions of an administrative agency. Certain specific deci-
sions, such as the impeachment of the President or the appointment
of ambassadors, are assigned to other institutions by the Constitution,
and criminal trials are generally regarded as beyond the scope of
agency authority, but one hardly needs legal process, or new legal
process, to explain such exceptions. Some legal scholars have tried to
argue, by means of the nondelegation doctrine, that agencies should
not be permitted to engage in broad-based policy making,but this po-
sition has been definitely rejected by the Supreme Court, even in its
current incarnation.
Congress also engages in a number of activities that go beyond the
law making role ensconced in high school civics books. The over-
sight it exercises over administrative agencies, a process that occupies
a large proportion of its time and determines its committee structure,
is an essentially executive function. To justify it as being preliminary
to legislation represents nothing more than an effort to salvage an
outmoded distinction through the use of wordplay. Moreover, Con-
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gress has created an agency under its direct control, the General Ac-
counting Office, to expand its oversight capacities.7" With respect to
judicial functions, the Constitution assigns Congress responsibility for
conducting impeachment trials." In carrying out its executive over-
sight function, it frequently relies on hearings that are largely adjudi-
catory in character. The law-making process itself often proceeds
through hearings that bear a close resemblance to court proceedings,
rather than through the type of policy analysis that Fuller's image of
polycentric decision making seems to conjure up.78
Most important, for present purposes, are the various roles
adopted by the courts. As virtually every political scientist who studies
courts asserts,79 and as discussed at length in our book,"0 courts make
public policy. They often do so, moreover, by promulgating rules,
and while it is true that they do not always make policy by stating
rules, it is also true that courts sometimes state rules even when they
are merely interpreting a statute. The Supreme Court attempted to
distinguish such rule making from adjudication, and forbid it, but it
soon abandoned the effort. Courts also engage in a wide variety of
administrative functions; they not only administer their own opera-
tions, but they also administer bankrupt estates, issue structural in-
junctions and then supervise compliance, and hire and supervise spe-
cial masters to carry out these functions. At the federal level,
formulation of both the Rules of Civil Procedure and Sentencing
Guidelines8' are the responsibility of agencies located within the judi-
cial branch. In short, there is no simple correspondence between in-
stitutions and decision making styles in the modem state.
A second factor that tends to decrease the relative advantages of
different institutions is that institutions are composed of people. It is
71; See 31 U.S.C. §§ 701-704 (creating the agency independent of the executive branch).
77 See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7.
78 See Ftuller, supret note 21, at 393405 (discussing adjudication and its ability to solve poly-
centric situations).
79 See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY (1990); LEE EPSTEIN &
JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE (1992); CHARLES JOHNSON &
BRADLEY CANON,JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984); CLENDON SCHUBERT,
JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING (rev. ed. 1974); MARTIN SHAPIRO, supra note 5; HAROLD SPAETH,
SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING: EXPLANATIONS AND PREDICTIONS (1979).
so FEELEY& RUBIN, supra note 1, at 4, 25.
8 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3673 (2003) & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2003)). For commentary, see KATE STITH &JOSE
A. C ABRANES, FEAR OFJUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDFLINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 82-85 (1998)
(stating that guidelines undermine traditional authority of the judge); Marc L. Miller & Ronald
F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 723 (1999) (arguing that federal sentencing reform is a disaster); Ronald F.
Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1991) (asserting that U.S. Sentencing Commission should be subject to
administrative law doctrines).
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easy enough to say, or write, that the legislature passed such-and-such
a statute, or that the bureau of prisons did so-and-so, but legislatures
and bureaus cannot really act; it is the people comprising them who
are the real actors. If these people are members of a single political
culture, as they are in the United States, their actions will tend to dis-
play a certain similarity, despite the differences in their institutional
setting. Asked to develop fair procedures for placing prisoners in
administrative segregation, for example, an American legislator and
an American judge are both likely to think in terms of due process.
Due process is our dominant principle for achieving fairness in any
situation where individuals are being punished for disobeying a pre-
vailing rule; it is part of our general legal culture, and one does not
need to a be a member of any particular institution to understand
and favor it. This is not to say that people's institutional setting does
not make a difference-it does-but only that it does not make as
dramatic a difference as an analysis of that setting, in the abstract,
might suggest.
The particulars of American government tend to decrease institu-
tional differences still further. To begin with the judiciary, which has
been the focus of the legal process school's analysis, it is notable that
there is no separate career track for judges in the United States, as
there is in many European countries. Rather, judges are selected in
mid-career from the ranks of practicing attorneys, law professors,
government administrators and, occasionally, legislators. Thus, their
backgrounds are quite similar, and sometimes identical, to those of
the relatively large number of law-trained legislators or administrators
and they will often share a basic outlook with individuals in other
parts of government. In particular, American judges tend to be
pragmatic, with a solid understanding of political realities, an aver-
sion to excessively complex doctrinal arguments, and a willingness to
modify pre-existing doctrine in the interest of workable results and
general perceptions of justice.
Even when courts reach decisions that are at odds with majority
opinion, they are likely to be allied with important and powerful po-
litical groups that also influence the legislature and executive. Thus,
the substantive due process decisions in the early twentieth century
were arguably in conflict with the majority opinion that stood behind
Progressive legislation, but they were aligned with the views of prop-
ertied interests that still wielded substantial influenceY Similarly,
82 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (striking down an Oklahoma
law regulating ice businesses); Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking
down District of Columbia's minimum wage law); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (restricting application of Kansas law to fix meat-packing indus-
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Brown v. Board of Education 3 may not have commanded a majority
when it was decided, but it was certainly consonant with liberal views
that were important at the time, and dominant thereafter. The deci-
sion that was generally regarded as the very worst, and most disrup-
tive, that the Supreme Court ever made, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 4 was
probably in conflict with majority views when it was decided in 1857,
but that majority was a rather narrow and bitterly contested one, as
the Civil War was soon to prove.
In The Hollow Hope, Gerald Rosenberg argues that courts cannot
produce significant social change, the expectation that they can do so
being his hollow hope. 5 Most controversially, perhaps, he argues that
Roe v. Wade86 did not constitute a significant reform because state leg-
islatures were moving toward legalized abortion immediately prior to
the Supreme Court decision, and would have done so rapidly in its
absence. The evidence that he marshals to support this point also
supports the argument thatjudicial attitudes are not dramatically dif-
ferent from those of legislatures or executives. But the conclusion
that he draws reflects the tendency of legal process scholars to over-
state their case. If one expects the Court, because of its institutional
position, to take action that no other part of government could con-
ceivably adopt, if one expects it to declare abortion constitutionally
protected in 1857, or declare inequality of income unconstitutional
in 2002, then one's hopes will indeed be hollow. In the United
States, however, institutional differences between the judiciary and
other parts of government cannot be measured in such apocalyptic
terms. They exist, but they are incremental, reflecting shifts of em-
phasis rather than dramatic discontinuities.
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the disadvantaged institu-
tion's own awareness of its disadvantages. The fact that courts were
not the optimal institutions to reform American prisons is clear to
any knowledgeable observer. But this was equally clear to the courts
that carried out the process of reform. In virtually every case, the
court was acutely conscious of its own limitations, and acutely con-
scious that it was acting because the preferable government institu-
tions-the prison administrators, the governor, the state legislature-
had refused to act. In virtually every case, courts were extremely re-
luctant to devise their own solutions, but rather reached out to adopt
standards that had been developed by corrections professionals such
try wages); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down New York statute regulating
the work hours of bakers).
83 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (striking down segregated public schools as unconstitutional).
84 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding a slave is not a citizen and had no ight to access the courts).
8', GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTs BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991).
86 110 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state anti-abortion statutes as unconstitutional).
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as the U.S. Bureau of Prisons or the American Correctional Associa-
tion. Many courts employed corrections professionals as special mas-
ters, and relied heavily on these masters to both find facts and design
remedies. Other courts anxiously sought to resolve the litigation by
consent decree, so that the new procedures would be developed by
the corrections officials themselves, rather than the court.
Because they were so acutely conscious of their institutional disad-
vantages, those disadvantages were greatly reduced. The actions just
described are not only evidence of institutional circumspection and
self-abnegation; they are also effective strategies for combating the
reason for such circumspection and self-abnegation. After all, what
would the governor or the legislature have done, operating in its
most characteristic, legal process-sanctioned mode? First, they might
have appointed a corrections professional to visit the prisons and
gather information, overcoming the prison officials' reluctance to
host this visiting professional with threatened legal sanctions. Then
the legislature might have held a hearing, or the governor might have
created a commission that held hearings, with other corrections pro-
fessionals from well-regarded systems, such as the U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, or from national organizations such as the American Correc-
tional Association, in attendance.
In short, the legal process' assumption that each governmental in-
stitution employs a distinctive decision making style is unwarranted.
Because these institutions are complex, because they are staffed by
individuals with similar perspectives, and because these individuals
are themselves aware of the issues raised by legal process, each insti-
tution is capable of deploying a wide range of styles. It may be the
case that there is some gain in efficiency or effectiveness in relying on
a particular institution for the decision making style that is tradition-
ally associated with it. But these gains are likely to be marginal, or in-
cremental, rather than the dramatic ones envisioned by the legal
process school. Perhaps courts are better at adjudication, or at rea-
soned argument, than agencies, perhaps legislatures are better at
high-level policy making than courts or agencies, but this difference
would need to be established by a detailed, fine-tuned analysis; it
cannot simply be asserted as an obvious conclusion.
Where legal process analysis does offer more dramatic results is in
the analysis of comparative decision making styles. If an agency or a
legislature is going to adjudicate the legal status of an individual, it
needs to gather evidence and reach a reasoned decision that applies
the prevailing rules to the situation at hand. In addition to these effi-
ciency-based considerations, it needs to ensure fair treatment by satis-
fying the requirements of due process. If a court is going to engage
in policy making, it must develop mechanisms to define the problem,
generate alternative solutions and evaluate those alternatives. Con-
ducting adjudications by inquisition, of the sort Congress carried out
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during the McCarthy era, or making policy through reasoned argu-
ment from precedent is highly undesirable. If government institu-
tions were committed to a particular style of decision, the compara-
tive institutional analysis of legal process would yield definitive
results; since they are not, legal process has the most to offer as a
comparative analysis of decision styles. Rather than telling a hypo-
thetical constitution drafter how to allocate responsibility and telling
each institution whether to decide or defer, legal process can tell
these institutions what sort of approaches they should adopt if they
decide to act.
This alternative interpretation of legal process analysis is already
well represented in legal literature. To mention just two examples,
Peter Strauss argues, on grounds similar to those stated above, that
the most useful concept in a modern administrative state is the sepa-
ration of functions, not the separation of powers. Powers are inevi-
tably combined in the administrative agency; the question is whether
functions, such as prosecution and adjudication or policy making and
implementation, should be separated within the general framework
of the agency. In his analysis of regulation, Stephen Breyer asserts
that there is no single optimal methodology, but rather that different
problems are best addressed by different regulatory approaches .8
Inefficiency or ineffectiveness occurs in cases of regulatory mismatch,
that is, when the legislature chooses or the agency applies the wrong
methodology. Both these sources, and many others, point to an
analysis that avoids global characterizations and focuses on the spe-
cific methodologies that government institutions employ. In doing
so, they suggest that it is the decision making method, not the institu-
tion, to which comparative analysis most usefully applies.
B. A Theory of the Second Best
The shift from institutions to decision making methodologies re-
solves at least part of the quandary that confronted federal judges in
the prison cases. If the legislature or the executive had been pre-
pared to remedy the morally unacceptable conditions that prevailed
in American prisons, and particularly Southern prisons, during the
1960s, the judges would have been well advised to defer to these deci-
sion makers. According to the revision of legal process suggested
above, the basis for this deference is not a categorical prohibition
against judicial policy making, but a much milder suggestion that the
87 See generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions-A Foolish Inconsistency? 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987); Peter L. Stiauss, The Place of Agen
cies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
88 See generally STEPHEN G. BREYR, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1984).
Apr. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITVTIONAL LA W
legislature and executive would probably be more effective in deploy-
ing the methodologies that policy analysis demands. Because the po-
litical branches were not prepared to act, however, the task of making
new public policy for prisons fell to the courts. There is no reason
why the courts should decline to carry out this task, at least where a
moral imperative for doing so exists. But in doing so, courts should
not rely on the same methodology that they use to apply a well-
established policy to specific cases. Rather, they should use the same
policy making techniques that the legislature and executive would, or
at least should, have used.
This resolution, however, only addresses the technical capacity of
different governmental institutions. It does not fully answer the re-
lated, more political argument that the legal process school has ad-
vanced, that is, the argument that certain decisions are committed to
certain institutions, either because these institutions are politically
accountable, or because they are not politically accountable. It would
be wrong, according to this view, for an unelected court to make pol-
icy, even if it would do an equally good, or even better job, and it
would be wrong for a politically accountable executive body to adju-
dicate the legal status of individuals, even if it could do so just as ac-
curately and as fairly as a court. As stated above, this is not a reitera-
tion of the argument about the technical capacities of these
institutions, but about their political role in our general system of
government.
Although the political argument is distinct from the technical
one, it is partially answered by the same considerations that were
stated above with respect to the technical capacities of institutions. It
is simply a caricature to depict the courts as an autocratic bull in the
majoritarian china shop of public policy, or the executive branch as a
political bull in the court's equally delicate doctrinal shop. Because
institutional roles already overlap to a considerable extent, because
these institutions are staffed by people with similar attitudes and
backgrounds, and because these individuals are aware of their institu-
tional limitations, there is no necessary reason why courts cannot be
sensitive to public view, or why an executive agency cannot carry out
fair adjudications. Moreover, the fact that these institutions can func-
tion in this matter also provides an argument why they should not
categorically defer to each other. Since courts are somewhat respon-
sive to public opinion, an agency need not treat its own responsive-
ness in that arena as disqualifying it from the field of adjudication.
Since agencies, and even the legislature, are often somewhat insu-
lated from public opinion, either through conscious effort or as a re-
sult of interest group pressure, courts need not regard their own par-
tial insulation as a prohibition against making public policy.
These considerations are not a complete answer to the political
component of the comparative institutional analysis because there is
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a further difficulty that is not present in the technical component.
An allocation of political authority means that the result a particular
decision maker reaches, even if that result is inaction in the face of a
moral demand, is the result that the system, or the system designer,
really wants. The ability of another decision maker to act as compe-
tently or effectively is irrelevant to this consideration because the is-
sue at stake is the need for action in the first place. Of course, if a
court can argue that the legislature's or executive's inaction results
from a defect in the political system, a "Footnote Four""" problem
such as the presence of discrete and insular minorities or the breach
of fundamental rights, it has a higher law basis for its action. If such
considerations are absent, or if they are not accepted as a basis for in-
tervention, then the argument for judicial action appears to rest on
an ideological, non-public-oriented ground. An advocate who was al-
ready committed to prisoners' rights, for instance, would not hesitate
to demand judicial intervention in these circumstances. But for
someone adopting a broader, public-oriented position, the allocation
of political responsibility seems to take precedence over any particu-
lar policy position. This does not mean, of course, that the desig-
nated decision maker is always right, that its decision always repre-
sents the desirable result. What it does mean, however, is that
arguments about whether a decision is right or wrong should be di-
rected to that designated decision maker.
This problem is closely linked to the issue of the scholar's role.
The public-oriented discourse of prescriptive legal scholarship seems
to be aligned with the view that favors allocation of responsibility over
a specific policy position. Scholars are expected to prescribe optimal
public policy for the most effective way to achieve a pre-defined goal.
A prisoners' rights attorney would certainly seek out any decision
maker who was sympathetic to the cause of reform. Legal writing di-
rected to such advocates would take a similar position; it might say,
for example, that if the legislature and executive refused to act, the
attorney should try to circumvent them by going to the courts, and
then proceed by recommending various devices or arguments to con-
vince the courts not to defer, such as not bringing the issue of defer-
ence to the judges' attention. But scholars are not supposed to adopt
such a stance. Their task is to determine whether prison reform
represents optimal social policy, and the allocation of responsibility is
an important, and perhaps decisive, factor in that determination, cer-
tainly not one that should be circumvented or ignored.
89 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1935) (discussing the
need for a more exactingjudicial scrutiny when a statute may involve prejudice against "discrete
and insular minorities").
Apr. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONS77TUTIONAL LA W
Here again, however, the concept of the second best solution can
be invoked, in this case, on the scholar's behalf. The best prescrip-
tion for a public-oriented position is to speak to the government as a
totality, or to all its decision makers as a group. "This is the proper
institution to address this issue," the scholar might say, "and this is
what it should do." On the basis of the same evidence that the judges
relied on, however, the scholar might conclude that those optimal in-
stitutions are unwilling to act and will continue to be unwilling for
the foreseeable future. This, of course, does not invalidate their pre-
scriptions, but it can be viewed as opening up another discursive pos-
sibility, that is, to address a second best decision maker who is pre-
pared to act. If the action can be justified on independent moral
grounds, then the recommendation has value. Its value is derived
from the same consideration that motivates the judge-that judicial
action might not be the best solution, but it is better than nothing.
Such a recommendation may resemble a recommendation to an
advocate to use whatever means available to achieve his goal, but this
is not equivalent. The scholar's recommendation does not abandon
all public-oriented considerations in favor of a pre-established posi-
tion. Rather it maintains its public orientation but factors a political
reality into the analysis. This would not lead the scholar to prescribe
judicial action under any circumstances the way the advocate would;
it simply removes the legal process argument that only the optimal
decision maker should take action, and allows the scholar to pre-
scribe action that is otherwise justified. It speaks to the judge's actual
position, acknowledging her subjective sense that a remedy is desir-
able and that no other decision maker is likely to provide it.
Moreover, the fact that the recommendation to ajudge represents
a second best solution is one that can become part of the scholar's
analysis. As stated above, a judge's sense that she is not the optimal
decision maker can suggest to her that she proceed with caution, and
perhaps take public opinion into account. Scholars can contribute to
judicial awareness of this possibility, and alter their own recommen-
dations accordingly. This is a much less dramatic divergence from a
purely public-oriented stance than Bickel's passive virtues. Bickel
recommended that judges avoid reaching decisions for the purpose
of preserving the legitimacy of their institution, but he never quite
explained why the preservation of the court's legitimacy, as opposed
to the legitimacy of the government in general, is in the public inter-
est." The most plausible explanation is that the courts should save
their legitimacy for a rainy day. Apart from the fact that legal process
90 See generally BICKEL, supra note 21, at 111-98 (discussing the role of passive virtues in de-
termining the involvement of the courts for an issue).
9 Id. at 29-33.
[Vol. 5:3
JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
scholars never offered any suggestions about when it would be rainy
enough to expend some of their carefully saved moral capital, the dif-
ficulty with this is that it places the legitimacy of the courts above
other values, thereby transforming the scholar into a political advo-
cate for judicial legitimacy. The recommendation that judges pro-
ceed cautiously and pay attention to public opinion, in contrast, re-
tains public interest as the primary consideration. It simply allows for
the satisfaction of that interest by means of a second best solution.
Thus, the new legal process analysis can be used to decide
whether judges should make public policy and whether litigation
against the government is a desirable mechanism of governance.
There are strong arguments, however, for modifying the analysis by
allowing for second best solutions, and public-oriented legal scholars
can incorporate these modifications without compromising their dis-
cursive stance. These modifications involve shifting the focus of at-
tention from institutions to decision making styles, and factoring po-
litical conditions into both the judge's decision to take action and the
scholars' recommendations to judges on this issue. The way these
modifications operate in a real situation can be illustrated by examin-
ing the prison reform cases. The prison conditions cases serve as a
good test for the issues raised above for several reasons. Indeed, they
represent one of the most dramatic examples of judicial policymak-
ing in American history. Furthermore because they were bounded by
a relatively brief time period, they provide a convenient case study
with which to explore the issues discussed above.
C. The Prison Reform Cases
Prison conditions reform litigation began in earnest in 1965 in
Arkansas when "writ writers" at the Cummins Prison Farm filed sev-
eral pro se habeas corpus petitions in the court of E. Smith Henley,
the federal judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, alleging that
they were being held in unconstitutional conditions and requesting
their release!" Judge Henley, in whose district the prison was located,
was well-familiar with the long history of scandal and the conditions
in the prison. He consolidated the petitions and appointed two ex-
perienced lawyers to represent the petitioners. Their reformulated
complaint stated that the prisoners were being denied their rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, in violation of Sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . The petition alleged that
the Superintendent of Cummins Prison Farm had failed to provide
adequate medical care, had exposed them to unduly harsh working
92 Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
93 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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conditions, had subjected them to severe corporal punishment, and
had denied them access to the courts.'4 Prison officials did not con-
test most of these claims, and immediately transferred the complain-
ing inmates to better facilities, dismissed the guards named in the
complaint, and promised to improved regulations governing the ad-
ministration of the prison. However they were firm on their need to
maintain discipline and to oversee inmates' communications to the
outside world, including the courts." Judge Henley entered a judg-
ment on the uncontested matters, and then addressed the out-
standing issues in his opinion. He expressed concern about the use
of corporal punishment and the lack of standards governing its use,
and suggested that the Department of Corrections adopt regulations
restricting its use. But he did not prohibit its use:" However, Judge
Henley did find for the prisoners who had suffered reprisals for filing
complaints with the court"' He enjoined officials from intercepting
inmates' communications with the courts and from taking reprisals
against inmate writ writers!' However, his opinion concluded with a
note of good will. "[T] he record in this case," he wrote, "reflects that
respondent [the superintendent of the prison] has undertaken with
some success to ameliorate the condition of Penitentiary inmates in a
number of areas of prison life. For his efforts in that connection re-
spondent is entitled to a full measure of credit."'00 Noting that prison
officials had voluntarily corrected the other problems raised in the
prisoners' petition, Judge Henley saw no need to issue an order in
these areas. Indeed, he expressed his hope that the problems in the
prison had been resolved, and noted that the "[c]ourts cannot take
over the management of the prisons, and they cannot undertake to
review every complaint made by a convict about his treatment while
in the prison.""' Rather than resolving problems, however, this small
victory triggered a flood of new petitions from inmate writ writers.
Two cases eventually developed, though neither was handled by
Judge Henley. The first was Jackson v. Bishop,'2 handed down in 1967;
the second was Courtney v. Bishop,"' handed down a year later. In
Jackson, two judges, Oren Harris and Gordon E. Young, jointly heard
94 Talley, 247 F. Supp. at 685.
95 Id. at 687.
96 Id. at 690.
97 ht. at 689.
98 Id. at 690.
99 /d. at 691.
10' Id. at 691-92.
0) i. at 686.
102 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (permanently enjoining Arkansas state prison officials
from using certain corporal punishments).




the case.0 4 Despite testimony that revealed widespread beatings, the
use of the notorious "Tucker telephone" and other abuses, they dis-
missed the inmates' complaints, saying that the courts should not
second-guess decisions of prison administrators. ' However, on ap-
peal Judge Harry Blackmun, then of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, vacated the district court's judgment, and ordered it to enter a
decree enjoining corporal punishment in its entirety. 1°6 In his expan-
sive opinion, Judge Blackmun drew heavily on the testimony ofJames
V. Bennett, the former and longtime director of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, and Fred T. Wilkinson, director of the Missouri Depart-
ment of Corrections."" Both had argued that corporal punishment
was "unusual" because only two states still permitted it, and "cruel"
because "[w] hipping creates other penological problems and makes
adjustment to society more difficult." "' In Courtney, also a consolida-
tion of a number of separate petitions, attorneys for the petitioners
drew heavily on testimony in both Talley and Jackson as well as find-
ings from a recently completed report issued by the Arkansas State
Police that documented extensive problems in the prisons to mount a
sweeping attack on the state's correctional system.' They challenged
the process for imposing solitary confinement, treatment in solitary
confinement, and the crowded, dangerous and dirty conditions in
the prisons."0 Taken as a whole, petitioners maintained, these prob-
lems constituted cruel and unusual punishment."' Judge Harris dis-
missed the petition,"' and a panel of judges on the Eighth Circuit
upheld him, reaffirming a belief that "[t]he law to be applied is well
settled. Lawful incarceration necessarily operates to deprive a pris-
"13oner of certain rights and privileges he would otherwise enjoy ....
These two cases began amidst an escalating scandal over abuses in
the state's prisons: beating of prisoners with leather straps, continued
use of the "Tucker telephone," brutal inmate-trustees, forced labor, a
virtual absence of security in the overcrowded barracks housing in-
mates, lack of medical care, pervasive violence, lack of any meaning-
ful oversight or regulations, and rumors of unreported deaths of in-
104 Jackson, 268 F. Supp. at 806.
i ld. at 815. The court did enjoin the use of crank telephones, teeter board, and strap until
regulations were promulgated. Id. at 816.
t0( Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 581 (8th Cir. 1968).
107 Id. at 575.
108 Id. at 580. Judge Blackmun chose to "draw no significant distinction between the word
'cruel' and the word 'unusual' in the Eighth Amendment," but still had "no difficulty" finding
the use of the strap to be both. Id.
109 Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969).
110 Id. at 1186.
I Id. at 1187.
112 Id. at 1186.
11 Id. at 1187
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mates. Long acknowledged to be a problem, conditions in the state's
prisons gained salience when they were exposed in the report pre-
pared by the Arkansas State Police and issued by outgoing governor,
Orville Faubus, in January 1967. Received by the new Republican
governor Winthrop Rockefeller on his first day in office, this report
precipitated his campaign for prison reform."4 These revelations and
this campaign helped establish the context for the continuing litiga-
tion and provided an added impetus for prison litigators and no
doubt for the judges as well.
The small and partial victories in these initial cases paved the way
for still more complaints, although they were slender reeds on which
to build court-ordered reform. Talley was essentially a settlement
without any judicial findings, although Judge Henley did insist on the
need to protect prisoners against retaliation for exercising their
rights.' Jackson had been dismissed outright, but on appeal Judge
Blackmun used sweeping language to reinstitute the case and to or-
der an end to corporal punishment."' In Courtney the district court
judge dismissed the complaint and was upheld on appeal by a panel
that used sweeping language to insist that the courts lacked authority
to deal with the issues.
Still, the small victories in some of these cases were enough to
pave the way for more complaints, and enough for Judge Henley in
1969 to consolidate them in a case known as Holt v. Sarver."8 Al-
though named as the defendant, this case was allegedly encouraged
by the new commissioner of corrections, C. Robert Sarver. ' As it de-
veloped, it eventually expanded to include all prisoners in the Arkan-
sas prison system; it was the nation's first systemwide "totality of con-
ditions" case. Thus, in a series of rulings beginning in 1965 and
continuing until 1982,"" each more expansive than the previous one,
114 This history is recounted in FEELEY& RUBIN, supra note 1, at 53-59.
115 Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 at 690-91.
11 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d at 572, 579.
17 Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d at 1187.
118 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
119 Interview with A.L. Lockhart, Comm'r, Arkansas Dep't of Corrections, Cummins Prison
Farm, in Grady, Ark. (Jan. 2, 1992). For an extended account of this development, see FEELEY
& RUBIN, supra note 1, at 51-54.
120 Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969) (affirming trial court's dismissal of in-
mate plaintiff's claim); Finney v. Mabry, 455 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Aik. 1978) (finding that prison
disciplinary procedures violated due process rights); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D.
Ark. 1976) (issuing a final court decree setting standards for prison housing, medical treatment,
and other practices); Holt v. Hutto (Holt I11), 363 F. Stipp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (finding that
racial discrimination in cell and work assignments violated inmates' constitutional rights); Holt
v. Sarver (Holt 11), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (finding that prison conditions and prac-
tices violated constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Talley v.
Stephens, 247 F. Stipp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (issuing an injunction against prison practices that
were cruel and unusual punishment).
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Judge Henley and his successor Judge G. Thomas Eisele presided
over hearings that explored virtually every facet of prison life and
administration, and issued remedial orders that affected each of
them. In these cases, well-regarded correctional administrators with
national reputations testified that conditions in the state's prisons
were wholly out of line with modern correctional practice. They
failed to meet standards followed by the federal prison system and
the standards of other related organizations.2 2 The method of disci-
pline through whippings had long been abandoned by virtually all
other states. Practices in Arkansas prisons fell well below those in
prison systems of most other states and the federal prison system.'
2 3
Indeed, this was mild criticism. What the state called administrative
punishment was sadism. What the state called "discipline" was tor-
ture. '2 5 What the state called "guards" were inmate trustees who ruled
by fiat and force.12 1 What the state called "solitary confinement" con-
sisted of cramming as many as eleven prisoners in a single cell for
prolonged periods under conditions that were "hazardous to health"
and "degrading and debasing.' 2 7 What the state called work was la-
bor enforced at the end of a gun barrel or the lash of a belt. 12
In light of such testimony, Judge Henley eventually held that the
"totality of the conditions" in the state's prisons violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."
2 1
At some point, it became clear to him that his task was not to hold
the correctional system to its own standards-it had none-but the
more fundamental task of establishing standards. He had to bring the
Arkansas prisons into the twentieth century, to oversee the creation
of a modern prison system. In so doing he had to dismantle the en-
trenched plantation model under which Arkansas prisons had long
operated. His challenge was to alter a way of life, a taken-for-granted
. 121 Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 814 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (excerpting testimony from Mr.
Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson).
122 1(.
123 Id. at 815.
124 Holt v. Sarver (Holt 1), 300 F. Supp. 825, 831-32 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (describing the condi-
tions of isolated confinement).
125 Holt I1, 309 F. Supp. at 372-73 (analyzing the plaintiffs claim of cruel and unusual pun-
ishmnent). See also Finney v. Ark. Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 205 (8th Cir. 1974) (describing the
inmates' suffering physical and mental brutality).
12, Holt II, 309 F. Supp. at 373-76.
127 Holt 1, 300 F. Supp. at 832-33.
128 Holt I1, 309 F. Supp. at 371. For accounts of conditions at Cummins and Tucker Prison
Farms, see generally FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 59-79 (describing conditions while pro-
viding a summary of the Arkansas prison cases); HARRIS & SPILLER, AFTER DECISION:
IMPLEMENTATION OFJUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS: A CASE STUDY OF HOLT V
SAIIV', National Institute of justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Depart-
ment ofJustice (1976) (detailing the history of inplementation of the Arkansas cases).
12 Holt 1, 300 F. Supp. at 828.
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sense of what a prison was and ought to be. He had to reconstitute
the idea of a prison. Although since the first case, Talley v. Stephens, a
reform-minded governor had appointed two different reformers
sympathetic to court-ordered reform to head the state's prisons sys-
tem, as an institution the department had neither the vision nor the
capacity to establish and administer a modern prison system. Its sev-
eral prisons were still run as largely independent units, anchored in
the plantation model, and still expected to operate at no or small cost
to the state. The challenge was not even one of structural reform;
what was required was near total transformation. The normative ori-
entation of the prison system needed to be replaced and a new vision
had to be institutionalized and then implemented.
This task required Judge Henley to make policy, to establish a set
of new goals and purposes for the institution, and then to devise ways
to implement this plan. Although he had initially fumbled with ways
to tackle this task through an expansive use of "due process," eventu-
ally he came to understand the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment as a grant of power that au-
thorized him to formulate penal policies and then implement them.
Although he, and later other judges in other conditions 
cases,
struggled to say that they were merely "applying" the Constitution, his
actions belie this. Up until then the Eighth Amendment had rarely
been interpreted by the courts, and in those few instances when it
had, the issues dealt with capital and other forms of punishment, not
conditions of confinement. Had Judge Henley restricted himself to
"interpreting" legal doctrine, he would have confronted a string of
cases dating back to at least 1871, when the Virginia Supreme Court
had ruled that a convicted felon, "as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights... he is for the
time being the slave of the State. He is civiliter mortuus. . . ." '
By the time Judge Henley handed down his first systemwide deci-
sion in Holt v. Sarverin 1969, not much had changed. The courts had
ceased to use such crude terms, but the substance of their policies
was much the same as it had been in 1871. Until 1961, the "hands off
doctrine" meant that prison inmates were without recourse to chal-
lenge their conditions of confinement.12 The Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" provided no
130 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (ordering the Texas Depart-
ment of Corrections to improve prison conditions); Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. StIpp. 122 (N.D.
Colo. 1979) (denying the motion to stay execution of a court-ordered closing of the prison).
131 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
1' Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) brought about the change. In that case the Supreme
Court held that officials could be sued for violating constitutionally protected rights if they were
acting "under color of law." That case precipitated an avalanche of claims against police and
eventually against prison officials. Id.
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guidance, and indeed the Thirteenth Amendment expressly ex-
empted convicted felons when it abolished slavery and involuntary
servitude.' At best the Eighth Amendment was a vague and general
admonition. It had been written before prisons were established as
institutions for mass incarceration for ordinary offenders, and had
not been discussed at any length at the Constitutional Convention
(and to the extent it had been, was brought up in the context of pro-
hibiting drawing and quarterin).l5 4 UntilJudge Blackmun's opinion
for the circuit court in Jackson"' and Judge Henley's rulings in Holt I,
the prevailing wisdom was that judges should not second-guess the
discretionaryjudgments of prison administrators.
But armed with this new self-imposed authority he derived from
the Eighth Amendment, Judge Henley "took charge" in much the
same way that the head of a new administrative agency might take
charge following legislation establishing the agency and authorizing
it to develop policy within the scope of its mandate. The term "total-
ity of conditions" that the courts came to use to describe the nature
of the constitutional violations in prisons succinctly and accurately
captured the challenges faced by Judge Henley and other judges in
the prison conditions cases. It was the totality of the conditions-
virtually every facet of prison life and administration-that offended
their sensibilities, and they had to devise ways to effect changes that
brought about root and branch changes.
Once Judge Henley embraced this administrative perspective, he
was free to both formulate and then implement new policies. In do-
ing so, he violated the conventional understanding of the rule of
law-he made policy rather than interpreted it. He oversaw the for-
mulation of detailed plans to implement this policy, and then he
oversaw the implementation of these plans. He did this by identify-
ing general goals and then asking corrections officials to work out de-
tailed plans to implement them, and to provide schedules for their
implementation. As he had in his first case, Talley v. Stephens, Judge
Henley took pains to praise corrections officials when they made pro-
gress or made an effort, but he also quietly admonished them to try
harder when they failed.
3
6
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Thirteenth Amendment reads, "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to theirjurisdiction."
1M LARRY BENKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1975) (recounting
Framers' intention to abolish torture); Anthony Grannucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (argues Framers misunderstood Eng-
lish prohibition, which proscribed excessive punishment but not torture per se).
135 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d. 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
M, 247 F. Supp. 683, 691-92 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
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At the outset the Commissioner of Corrections, the Governor and
key legislative leaders all welcomed the court's intervention, energy,
and leadership. 137 Despite this, Judge Henley continued to face in-
numerable obstacles. The Plantation Model was deeply ensconced in
the state's correctional system and in the state more generally. As
willing as he was to accommodate to the court, the corrections com-
missioner lacked the staff and the budget to embrace a modern vision
of corrections. When asked to prepare reports for implementing
even the simplest of changes, he readily agreed, but his agency lacked
staff to do the planning or even drafting a report. Although the top
leadership in the Department accepted, and even welcomed the
court's intervention, line staff deeply resented and resisted the idea
of reform. Furthermore, everyone, includingJudge Henley, failed to
anticipate just how massive a challenge prison reform would be. If
pressed hard enough, corrections officials could address one portion
of the court's multifaceted directives, but almost always this was at the
expense of backsliding in other areas. Furthermore, the more the
court and the Department worked to solve problems, the more prob-
lems it found. For instance, an early order required that the prisons
provide safe and secure housing for inmates. The Department of
Corrections readily agreed to this. But, it was quickly revealed that
the Department could not comply with the order. It had not the
guards; it depended upon inmate prison trustees, recruited from
among the most violent and brutal inmates, to maintain order in the
housing units. The Department simply did not have anyone else to
perform this function. judge Henley's response was to expand his
order in a way that addressed the state legislature: increase the
budget, get rid of inmate trustees, and hire free-world guards. Money
was appropriated, guards were hired. But then there were new prob-
lems: how to train them? What were the criteria for selection? Once
hired and trained, there needed to be a system of supervision. All
this in turn led to the need to develop a personnel office to institu-
tionalize recruitment and promotion, handle complains of racial dis-
crimination, and the like. Even then problems persisted. Prisoners
were housed in large open barracks with three-tiered bunks pushed
tightly together. It was virtually impossible for guards to police such
space. The prison needed a different design, more space, and a sys-
tem by which to classify prisoners. It had none of these, and indeed
was experiencing unprecedented growth just as the court was declar-
ing that the prison needed to provide prisoners with more and more
17 Interview with G. Thomas Eisele, District iudge, Eastern District of Arkansas, Little Rock,
Ark., (Jan. 3, 1992) (recounting cooperation of correctional officials with the court at the outset
of the litigation). For a detailed account of the case, see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 59-79.
The discussion in this paragraph draws from that account.
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secure space and more services. Similarly, the court's request to de-
velop an inmate classification system precipitated a host of problems:
an operational classification system required a trained staff, separated
housing, programming, and the like. The correctional system had
none of these. Such problems were repeated endlessly with issues re-
lating to heating and ventilation, sanitation, meal services, adminis-
trative discipline, health care, fire safety, and the like. The solution
to one problem revealed a seemingly endless chain of other prob-
lems, any one of which was capable of derailing meaningful im-
provements. Furthermore, such problems were compounded by a
chronic lack of funding, dilapidated facilities, understaffing, and a
rapidly growing prison population.
Problems like these are all too familiar to heads of all sorts of pub-
lic agencies-schools, hospitals, transportation authorities and wel-
fare departments. They are the sorts of challenges that legislators
and executives face every day. However, they are a strange agenda
forjudges. ButJudge Henley-and other judges who followed in his
wake-were not unaware of this. Judge Henley adopted the style and
the techniques of an administrator, and proceeded to tackle the
problems. He broke large problems down into component parts and
proceeded step by step to overcome them. He combined the carrot
and the stick, expressing sympathy and admiration for overworked
and underfunded correctional officials, commending legislative lead-
ers for providing more funding, and prodding sluggish officials into
more prompt actions. All the while, he expanded the reach of his
concerns, increased his demands for reports detailing plans and
documenting progress and insisted upon more detail.
As the initial good will and enthusiasm of corrections officials gave
way to exhaustion and tedium, and some time after Judge Henley was
appointed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a new District
Court Judge, G. Thomas Eisele, eventually appointed a corrections
expert to monitor compliance to the court's orders. 13  The title
"monitor" however is a misnomer. Although technically appointed to
report on the department's compliance to the court's orders, the
court-appointed monitor was instrumental in drafting many of the
court's orders and in designing many of the department's implemen-
tation plans in addition to investigating and writing up his findings
on compliance. He was in effect the judge's special assistant, a well-
138 It may not have been entirely fortuitous thatJudge Eisele was assigned the case after Judge
Henley, who sometime before had been appointed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
decided to relinquish it. A few years earlier, Judge Eisele had been Governor Winthrop Rocke-
feller's campaign manager and later chief of staff immediately after delivery of the State Police
Report documenting widespread abuses in the state's prisons. He had played a central role in
shaping the Governor's plans for prison reform. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supro note 1, at 74-76 for
a more detailed description of Eisele's role.
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regarded corrections expert who had both the time and knowledge
to understand problems and suggest solutions to the department and
to his boss. This increased capacity of the court solved some prob-
lems but exacerbated others; as before, efforts to solve one problem
led to the discovery of a host of new problems. And with increased
capacity, both criticism and problems increased. As with the experi-
ence with Judge Henley, the initial enthusiasm of corrections officials
for the monitor eventually gave way to irritation and resistance as he
kept finding new problems to complain about. Still Judge Eisele per-
severed, overseeing the continuing, expanding and renamed case un-
til 1982, when it was finally dismissed.
During this period, the Arkansas Department of Corrections was
transformed. It repudiated the feudal-like Plantation Model; no
one in power-corrections commissioners, legislators or the gover-
nor-publicly embraced the idea that prisoners were slaves of the
state, or that prisoners should be forced at the end of a shotgun to
work in the fields. State officials no longer endorsed the principle
that prisons should return a profit for the state, or that prisoners
should be deprived of medical care or subjected to control by inmate
trustees. Perhaps this remnant of the Old South would have faded
away for other reasons, as it apparently did in Florida. But there is no
doubt that in Arkansas the proximate cause for the transformation
was intervention by the federal courts. Judges Henley and Eisele em-
braced a vision of the prison as a public agency, grounded in princi-
ples of bureaucratic accountability and guided by the rehabilitative
philosophy of contemporary corrections. This is not to suggest that
the Arkansas correctional system was fully transformed in practice,
that it constitutes a model of bureaucratic accountability, or that it is
run on the principles of the rehabilitative ideal. It most certainly is
neither. Prisons throughout the United States remain brutal institu-
tions, permitting inmates to be subjected to sexual predators and vio-
lence. Yet, Arkansas' prison system is no longer a world apart from
prison systems in other states; it is organized as a public agency, as a
"system," and its commissioner, wardens and staff are accountable to
rules and regulations as are personnel in other public agencies.141 It
has free world guards, provides medical services for its inmates and
provides safer and more secure housing than it once did.'41 Although
serious problems in Arkansas prisons, as in prisons elsewhere, persist,
no one would doubt that conditions in the state's prisons were mark-
1' For a detailed account of the actions of the court and their impact on Arkansas's prison
system, see FEELEY & RUBIN, supr note 1, at 54-79; HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 128.
140 Finney v. Mabry, 546 F. Supp. 628, 642-43 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (describing a spectrum of rules
and regulations established in the prison system).
141 Id. at 642.
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edly better in 1982 when the protracted litigation came to an end 142
than they were in the mid-1960s, when Talley v. Stephens was de-
cided.'
43
What happened in Arkansas was replicated elsewhere to greater
and lesser degrees. The greatest challenge, and the most complex
cases, arose in the South. Since the Civil War, southern prisons had
operated on a distinctive model, the Plantation Model. By 1980, fed-
eral courts had declared conditions in prisons in Mississippi, Florida,
Louisiana, and Alabama to be unconstitutional in whole or in part,
and by 1985, prisons or entire prison systems in at least thirty-three
states had been added to this list. 144 By the mid-1990s this figure had
risen to forty-eight of the fifty-three separate jurisdictions in the
United States.145 In addition, conditions in countless numbers of
county jails were subject to sweeping court orders. These cases varied
widely in scope. Many involved single institutions, although often the
single largest prison in the state. Several involved entire prisons sys-
tems. The Eighth Amendment conditions cases affected virtually
every facet of prison life and administration. The cumulative impact
was that the federal courts developed a comprehensive code for
prison administration, covering such diverse matters as residence fa-
cilities, sanitation, food preparation and dietary consideration, cloth-
ing, medical care, discipline, staff hiring, libraries, work and educa-
tion. 1
6
In the litigation in some of these states, corrections commissioners
and state officials were largely cooperative and judges played an even
less intrusive role than did Judges Henley and Eisele. r' However in
others, judges faced fierce resistance at every step of the way, from
initial complaint, to the finding of liability, to the implementation of
remedial orders. In Texas, for instance, both the Texas Department
of Corrections and statewide elected officials not only thought the
court obtuse and meddlesome, it thought that its actions were wholly
14 Id. at 643.
143 For an assessment of changes in this and prisons subject to state-wide conditions suits, see
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 362-88.
144 National Prison Project, Status Report, updated January 1995, 1-2 (listing all system-wide
and other major prison conditions cases and the states they were filed).
145 Id.
146 See for instance the long list of matters covered by the court or the reports of the case
compliance monitor in Finney v. Mabry, 534 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (E.D. Ark. 1982). For a general
discussion of the cumulative effects of the prison conditions cases see FEELEY AND RUBIN, supra
note 1, at 366-75.
147 See, e.g., BRADLEY STEWART CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL: THE FEDERAL COURT
TAKEOVER OF GEORGIA PRISONS (1991) (providing an account of a negotiated settlement in an
expansive conditions case with a minimum ofjudicial involvement).
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unwarranted. 4 Texas, they maintained, not only operated a good
prison system, it was exemplary. Outside the South, the most expan-
sive conditions cases were confined to a handful of the larger and
older individual prisons, and were made in the context of a correc-
tional system that espoused the modern vision of correctional ad-
ministration embraced by the courts, even if they fell short in imple-
menting it. It was more a matter of holding prison officials to their
own standards rather than dismantling a wholly outmoded vision and
reconstituting another one.
Despite their extensive involvement in virtually every facet of the
administration of huge prison systems-far more extensive in detail
than in the school desegregation cases-there were no great and bit-
ter confrontations with public officials. The courts were not de-
nounced as usurpers of states' rights. There were no stand offs at the
prison gates. There were no fire bombs thrown through the windows
of the judges' homes.'4 ' Indeed, there was widespread, though quiet
and somewhat reluctant, recognition that what the judges were doing
was long overdue. Individual commissioners of corrections often
complained bitterly about a particular ruling or the arrogance of a
particular judge or special master, but on the whole the national cor-
rections establishment accepted, if not embraced, the effort. After
all, in their "takeover" of the prisons, federal judges did not attempt
to devise their own correctional policies; they turned to the correc-
tional establishment itself for guidance. They relied on those correc-
tions officials widely acknowledged as leaders in their field as expert
witnesses, consultants and special masters. Institutionally, the courts
turned to correctional institutions for guidance and instruction. The
American Correctional Association provided standards for correc-
148 For accounts of the Texas litigation and its systemwide conditions case, see Ruiz v. Estelle,
503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 80-95 (providing a brief
summary). See also BEN M. CROUCI & JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPLAL TOJUSTICE: LITIGATED
REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS (1989) (stating that the litigation transformed the culture of the
Texas Department of Corrections); STEVE J. MARTIN & SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, TEXAS
PRISONS: TIHE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN (1987) (asserting that the litigation modernized
the Texas prison system).
149 Perhaps the greatest controversy occurred in Texas. Right tip through trial, the Texas
Department of Corrections (TDC) denied the existence and use of "building tenders," inmate
trustees used to guard other prisoners. Even after overwhelming documentation of their use,
the TDC continued to deny their existence. The state's attorney general who was arguing the
case for the TDC and was also about ready to announce his decision to run for governor was on
the verge of mounting a head-on attack on the court over this issue when Steve Martin, a TDC
lawyer who had begun his career as a guard in Texas prisons and was now coordinating the liti-
gation for the Department, quietly informed him that the claims were true. This revelation un-
dermined the credibility of the TDC in the eyes of other state officials and paved the way for
more productive negotiations in dealing with the complex issues raised by the suit. For an ac-




tional administration "0 that the judges incorporated into their orders,
and the Federal Bureau of Prisons served as a model of accountability
and management. These norms embraced by the courts were not
alien to corrections officials; they were their own norms. The courts
did little more than require that prison officials honor the standards
that they themselves had formulated and embraced.
III. JUDGES AS SUCCESSFUL POLICY MAKERS
Overall, the prison conditions cases must be regarded as a success.
Almost all of the important prison conditions cases have been at the
trial court level, and the handful of appellate court rulings on the
subject have generally reaffirmed the lower court decisions, at most
trimming back here or there on remedial orders and at times lower-
ing the amount of court-ordered fees for the plaintiffs' attorneys.
Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor state legislatures nor
Congress has seriously attempted to undo what these trial courts have
ordered. Indeed, judicial policy making has been a success because
its goals have been embraced by both correctional leadership and by
the other branches of government at all levels. Across the country,
Congress, state legislatures and county supervisors have appropriated
funds to pay for the new facilities and services ordered by the courts,
and have sought to institutionalize standards embraced by the courts.
Some states have enacted legislation authorizing population caps on
prisons to assure that state prisons will not exceed court-ordered
maximums. Many state and local officials have drafted detailed regu-
lations, incorporating professional standards and procedures drawn
on by the courts for the operations of their custodial facilities. At the
national level, the Congress in 1981 enacted the Civil Rights for Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA),"" which encouraged states to
adopt professional standards for their prisons and expanded the au-
thority of the Department of Justice to investigate and bring suit
against those prisons not complying with these standards. Even be-
fore that, beginning in the late 1960s, the Department of Justice
through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration had spon-
sored national commissions to establish standards1'52 for the adimiini-
stration of criminal justice, including prisons, and had given its bless-
ing to the "minimum standards" project sponsored by the American
Bar Association."" And as we have pointed out above, the American
150 AMERICAN CORRECIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1977).
151 Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a-1997j (1996)).
2' AMERICAN CORRE(C1"IONALASSOcIA rION, supra note 150.
153 A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUST[ICE: LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS (4th draft 1980).
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Correctional Association had for many years promulgated standards
for prison administration and actively promoted their adoption by
their members. Numerous state correctional departments had come
to incorporate these standards into their own regulations. Similarly,
a long list of associated organizations-among them the American
Medical Association, the American Correctional Association, the
American Architectural Association, the American Public Health As-
sociation, the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals, the Na-
tional Fire Protection Association and a host of other associations-
had developed standards relating to the activities of their members in
designing, providing or maintaining services in prisons and other
types of custodial facilities.14 These standards too were often incor-
porated into state regulations. Finally, on the national level, both the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, created by an act of
Congress in 1968,' 5  and the National Institute of Corrections, created
by Congress in 1981, '5' were in part efforts to promote national stan-
dards for criminal justice administration. No doubt their creation
was designed in part to stave off or minimize judicial intervention,
but in doing so, they nevertheless contributed to the nationalization
of expectations about the administration of crimina justice. 7
Thus, the courts' involvement in establishing correctional policy
must be seen as part of the broader trend to establish national norms
for the administration of criminal justice. The courts have been
partners in a process that has taken place on many fronts. In some
areas, as in the prison conditions litigation, courts may have taken the
lead. But even then, they did not move far out in front; they deferred
to the views of national corrections leaders, and when state officials
evinced a willingness to take the lead, judges tended to recede into
the background and allow the other branches to manage the
changes. However they participated in the changes, the courts were
certainly not alone; their project was eventually embraced by all
branches of government at both the national and state levels.
Perhaps one important measure of success of the prison condition
cases is that from hindsight, it is difficult, if not impossible to imagine
the courts not extending "rights" to prisoners and tackling the prob-
lems of conditions in the prisons. However the idea might be
phrased, the idea that prisoners are "slaves of the state" simply cannot
hold after the "rights revolution." Nor is it really conceivable that the
154 See, e.g., AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION COMMISSION FOR CORRECTIONS, A
PROGRESS REPORT 3 (April 1977); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (AMA) STANDARDS FOR
HEALTH SERVICES INJAILS (1979).
155 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.S. § 3701 (repealed) (1984).
156 18 U.S.C.S. § 4351 (2000).
157 For an extended discnssion of this trend, see FEELEY& RUBIN, supra note 1, at 366-75.
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conditions and practices in prisons-unlike schools, mental hospitals
and the military-could be wholly off limits to the courts. In an era
when every other facet of the criminal process has been subjected to
judicial scrutiny and national norms, it is difficult to conceive that
prisoners and prisons could be exempt.
By arguing that the prison conditions cases were successful be-
cause in retrospect they appear to be almost inevitable or "natural,"
we do not mean to be Pollyannaish, to suggest a unilinear pattern of
progress, or to claim that the judges always "got it right." American
prisons remain terrible places in comparison to prisons in Northern
Europe. By the 1980s, the mood of the country had changed, and
the national agenda had changed. In particular the nation was get-
ting tough on crime. And there is no doubt that judges occasion-
ally overplayed their hands or that cases were not terminated in a
timely enough fashion."" ' No systemwide suits had been successful for
years, and courts began terminating long-standing court orders and
consent decrees. In 1996 Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act ("PLRA")1 60 which has made it significantly more difficult
for prisoners to bring claims in federal courts. This consolidation of
conservatism is important and represents a significant shift in Ameri-
can politics. It has had a substantial impact on American prisons. In
2001, there were over two and one-half as many people in state and
federal prisons in the United States than there were in 1985,'"' and
although prisons have been built at a record rate, overcrowding per-
sists. However, these developments have not done much to dismantle
the core elements of the national policies on prison conditions for-
mulated by the federal courts in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed in
many respects these policies are now more firmly entrenched than
ever. Courts continue to enforce core principles of the conditions
cases, and at times even expand them in some areas, most notably to
women's prisons, juvenile facilities and local jails. 62 Policies initially
generated by federal judges are now written into state regulations and
158 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY (2001).
159 Although they frequently lapse into a conservative polemic against "activist" federal
judges, in their book Detnocracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Government, Ross Sander
and David Schoenbrod provide examples of excesses when judges become too aggressive in
micromanaging structural reform cases and when cases are not terminated in a timely fashion.
However when they offer suggestions for ways to prevent these problems, they fall back on tradi-
tional conceptions of the judicial role offered by the legal process school and thus offer little by
way of valuable advice. See Ross SANDER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003).
160 Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1328-66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2003), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1997e (2003)).
161 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 486 (2001).
162 Seei e.g., FEELEY& RUBIN, supra note 1, at 382-88.
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rules governing corrections. Correctional departments everywhere
are better organized and more responsive to prisoners' rights. And
litigation and the threat of litigation continues to encourage correc-
tional agencies to take greater care. Perhaps the most significant fea-
ture of the 1996 PLRA is that it places time limits on remedial orders,
and makes it somewhat easier to modify existing court orders and
consent decrees. " '1 But the courts themselves had already been wres-
tling with these issues. And as important as the PLRA is, it does not
cut back on any of the substantive standards that the courts have im-
posed on correctional administrators.
Despite this success, there is no question that the judges in the
conditions cases violated well-understood limitations on judicial deci-
sion making. In particular, they violated two well-entrenched theo-
ries that constrain judicial decision making: the pillars of legal for-
malism (the principles of the rule of law, federalism and the
separation of powers), and the legal process school's prohibition
against deciding polycentric issues. They ignored the principle of the
rule of law when they took the Eighth Amendment as a grant of au-
thority to make policy rather than merely to interpret preexisting
rules. They ignored principles of federalism when they barged head-
long into an area traditionally regarded as the responsibility of the
states. And they violated the principle of the separation of powers
when they in effect created and then implemented an administrative
code for the operation of prison. Additionally, they violated the
principles of legal process when they ignored the admonition that
function follows form and embraced polycentric problem solving. An
observer from Mars would have been hard-pressed to distinguish the
activities of these judges from those of an aggressive administrator
who had been delegated responsibility by a legislature to make and
implement new policy.
The judges in the prison conditions cases also violated constraints
suggested by comparative institutional analysis of the new legal proc-
ess movement. The courts clearly did not defer to the branch that is
"least worst in a given situation."""' No one would seriously argue that
federal judges had any institutional advantage over other branches in
understanding and making policy about prison conditions. What
they did was to act when no other branches could or would act. Thus
we come back to the question we posed at the outset, "Were the
judges good enough?" In the discussion immediately above, we have
shown that they were. So the question is now, "Why?"
Earlier, we suggested that these questions could be answered by
reexamining and relaxing the assumption of optimality, by asking not
163 18 U.S.C. § 4352 (2003).
164 See KOMESAR, supra note 32.
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which institution is best (or least well) equipped to make policy in a
given area, but instead asking whether an institution is "adequate" to
the task. This seems to have been a question the judges in the prison
conditions put to themselves. When no other branch was prepared
to act, they appear to have asked, "Are we adequate to the task?" Ini-
tially as an institution, the judiciary was not certain. Judges certainly
did not dive in headlong to deal with the prison conditions cases with
great relish. They readily and continuingly acknowledged that they
were not the optimal decision makers, and that other institutions
were in far better positions to effect policy than they were. However,
when they saw that the other branches had not acted-and were not
likely to act-they concluded that they were "good enough." They
seemed to recognize what neither the old nor the new legal process
movements saw, that there is no simple correspondence between in-
stitutions and decision making styles.
The courts were adequate in part because their approach was
pragmatic, cautious and incremental-in part because prisoners and
policy making were not wholly alien to them. Although prisons were
strange territory to most judges, by the time the conditions cases
arose, the courts were readily familiar with the practice of extending
rights to various disadvantaged groups. Prisoners' rights were the last
in a long list of those to whom the courts had extended protections:
racial and ethnic minorities, criminal defendants, welfare recipients,
students and soldiers. It was but a small step to recognize this addi-
tional group as possessors of rights.
And when the courts did act, they moved carefully. Like many
other high-level political appointees, they were generalists and were
likely to have had broad experience in governmental affairs. They
knew how to proceed cautiously and where to look for advice. They
turned to conventional sources for their understanding of prisons.
They depended heavily on the testimony of well-regarded correc-
tions' leaders, who served as expert witnesses. And like any reform
administrator, they appointed special assistants, here called special
masters, to serve as their eyes and ears and advise them how to pro-
ceed. More generally, they embraced a conventional model of pris-
ons as envisioned by the American Correctional Association and
other national organizations. These are the same sources that a re-
form-minded governor or administrator would turn to if confronted
with the same problems.
It is hardly surprising that judges in these cases would embrace
such conventional views. They have had careers in public life. Most
have had extensive experience in administering public policies. As a
group in background, experience, attitude and values, they are virtu-
ally indistinguishable from state governors, their senior advisors, at-
torneys general, heads of major state agencies and influential legisla-
tors. Indeed, but for fate, many of the judges handling these cases
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might have been governors or heads of agencies overseeing correc-
tions or key advisors to governors or influential legislators with over-
sight for corrections, or in any of a number of other important policy
making positions. This, after all, is the recruiting ground for Ameri-
can judges. Ultimately, it is this common background, common set
of experiences and common approach to diagnosing and solving
problems that shape judges' visions, constrain their actions, and lead
them, even when most aggressively making policy, to embrace norms
that are conventional. In arguing this, we do not mean to claim that
policy in the American political process is always, or inevitably, con-
sensual. Most certainly it is not. But in most if not all areas, realistic
policy choices are severely constrained. Fragmentation of the gov-
ernmental process almost assures that this is the case. Nor do we
mean to claim thatjudges will inevitably be good policy makers. The
annals of law are replete with stories of idiosyncratic judges doing
stupid things. But individual judges rarely if ever make "policy." Our
concern is with the judiciary as an institution. Foolish rulings, even
by the highest courts, have a way of being distinguished or narrowed
or simply forgotten. Foolish cases by lesser judges if not overturned
on appeal may lead to individual catastrophe, but not necessarily bad
policies.
Ultimately, both the success of judges as policy makers and the
constraints on them as policy makers emerge from the same source.
As government officials imbricated in the complex, fragmented
American political system, they not only share similar public experi-
ences and the same pragmatic perspective with other government of-
ficials, but they also operate under the same sorts of constraints. To
be effective, their policies must nest within a larger set of policies.
Their part must fit within a larger accepted whole. If it fails in these
regards, a policy made by the judiciary, like such a policy made by
other officials, is likely to fail. There is, no doubt, ample evidence of
such failure ofjudicial policy making, as there is in other areas of pol-
icy making. But on the whole, judicial policy makers would rather
succeed than fail, and as a consequence judicial policy making is sub-
ject to self-imposed constraints that, we believe, are more powerful
and more effective than the more commonly understood restraints
proffered by the legal process school in either its older or newer
variations.
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